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LEGAL SETS 
Jeremy N. Sheff† 
In this Article, I propose that the practices of legal reasoning and analysis are 
helpfully understood as being primarily concerned not with rules or propositions, but 
with sets. This Article develops a formal model of the role of sets in the practices of 
legal actors in a common-law system defined by a recursive relationship between 
cases and rules. In doing so, it demonstrates how conceiving of legal doctrines as a 
universe of discourse comprising (sometimes nested or overlapping) sets of cases can 
clarify the logical structure that governs marginal cases and help organize the 
available options for resolving such cases according to their form. While many legal 
professionals may intuitively navigate this set-theoretic structure, the formal model 
of that structure has important implications for legal theory. In particular, it (1) 
generates a useful account of the relationships among rules, standards, and 
principles; (2) provides a novel set of tools for understanding the nature of precedent; 
and (3) illuminates an extra-linguistic dimension to the problem of judicial 
discretion. On the last point, I argue that discretion is not merely a product of the 
imperfect relationship between abstractions and reality, or between natural language 
and the world, but that it is instead an emergent property of the structure of legal 
practice: a structure composed of sets “all the way down.” 
  
 
 †  Professor of Law & Faculty Director, Intellectual Property Law Center, St. John’s 
University School of Law. I am grateful for comments and suggestions from Brian Bix, David 
Carlson, Marc DeGirolami, Greg Keating, Anita Krishnakumar, Sara Lawsky, Josh Sarnoff, and 
Larry Solum. All errors are the author’s alone. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Legal reasoning and analysis are helpfully understood as being 
primarily concerned, not with rules, or even with propositions, but with 
sets. Set-based logic permeates mature legal systems, and constitutes the 
deep structure connecting legal authorities to the behavior of legal 
actors. This is particularly so in common-law systems, where judicial 
opinions serve a dual function as both backward-looking dispositions 
and forward-looking authorities, setting up a recursive dynamic that can 
best be modeled using the logic of sets. In this Article, I will explain that 
logic and describe some of its implications. 
Consider that in many areas of law, our adversarial legal system 
channels disputes toward binary choices: Does this complaint state a 
cause of action or not? Is this statute constitutional or not? Is this 
defendant liable or not? Is this claimed element of damages recoverable 
or not?1 Even where a rule appears not to be framed in terms of binary 
outcomes, it is usually trivially easy to re-frame it in such a way: instead 
of asking “how broad is the plaintiff’s right?” we might instead ask “does 
the plaintiff have a right to x enforceable against this defendant?”2 
Indeed, this is an essential move in legal reasoning: the process of 
resolving legal disputes often consists of channeling amorphous, 
complex issues into a series of discrete binary questions winnowed and 
tested via the adversarial process.3 Reaching one of those binary 
outcomes typically depends on a judgment as to whether the facts of a 
case satisfy some test defined by a legal rule: Does this paragraph of the 
plaintiff’s complaint recite “mere conclusory statements”?4 Is this 
statute’s effect on private speech limited to the punishment of “fighting 
 
 1 See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 119–20 (1985). 
 2 Cf. generally WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS 
APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING: AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919). 
 3 See MARC O. DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 223 n.24 (2013) 
(citing TIMOTHY ANDREW ORVILLE ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW 72 (2000) (“It is a 
consistent feature of legal systems that legal institutions treat legal standards as if their 
application were bivalent.”)). 
 4 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). 
Sheff.40.5.9 (Do Not Delete) 7/15/2019  4:26 PM 
2032 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:2029 
words”?5 Would this liquidated damages award constitute a “penalty”?6 
And so on. 
My first claim is that all such legal rules can be understood to 
define categories, and the application of those rules to the facts of a 
particular case thus consists of a determination whether a particular 
state of the world falls within or without a relevant category. This first 
claim marks a minor departure from the sentential deontic models 
common in contemporary law and logic theory,7 but it has clear 
antecedents in Anglo-American legal theory. H. L. A. Hart noted that 
“[a]ll rules involve recognizing or classifying particular cases as 
instances of general terms.”8 Likewise, Frederick Schauer draws heavily 
on the notion of categories (and the related notion of generalizations) in 
his philosophical investigation of the nature of rules.9 Indeed, all 
analysis—legal or otherwise—may at some level be reduced to this type 
of “lumping” and “splitting.”10 But in this Article, my aim is to formalize 
the insight into a model of legal analysis, because such formalization 
yields new insights emergent from the model itself. As one prominent 
history of formal logic points out: 
Formalization is a difficult and tricky business, but it serves a 
valuable purpose. It reveals structure and function in naked clarity, as 
 
 5 Compare, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386–96 (1992), with Snyder v. 
Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 n.3 (2011); id. at 1226–27 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 6 U.C.C. § 2-718 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); see, e.g., Equitable Lumber 
Corp. v. IPA Land Dev. Corp., 344 N.E.2d 391, 397 (N.Y. 1976). 
 7 See generally PABLO. E. NAVARRO & JORGE L. RODRÍGUEZ, DEONTIC LOGIC AND LEGAL 
SYSTEMS (2014). 
 8 H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 123 (2d ed. 1994); see also id. at 124 (“[T]he law 
must predominantly, but by no means exclusively, refer to classes of person, and to classes of 
acts, things, and circumstances; and its successful operation over vast areas of social life 
depends on a widely diffused capacity to recognize particular acts, things, and circumstances as 
instances of the general classifications which the law makes.”) (emphasis in original). 
 9 See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 18–21 (1991). 
 10 Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some 
Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 479 (2004) (“It is 
sometimes said that the two most basic intellectual moves are ‘lumping’ and ‘splitting’—that is, 
finding relevant common characteristics that allow us intelligently and usefully to group 
apparently distinct phenomena into a single category (‘lumping’), and finding relevant 
distinguishing characteristics that allow us intelligently and usefully to separate otherwise 
similar phenomena into distinct classes (‘splitting’).”). 
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does a cutaway working model of a machine. When a system has 
been formalized, the logical relations between . . . propositions are 
exposed to view; one is able to see the structural patterns of various 
“strings” of “meaningless” signs, how they hang together, how they 
are combined, how they nest in one another, and so on.11 
This type of formalization must be distinguished from the typical 
meaning of the term “formalism” in legal theory. Historically, 
“formalism” in Anglo-American jurisprudence is (fairly or not) a 
pejorative term: it is a foil for the distinctively American school of Legal 
Realism.12 Even in its most sophisticated iterations, this concept of 
formalism is at bottom a substantive and indeed a normative construct: 
it distinguishes legitimate bases for judicial decision-making from 
illegitimate ones, and makes claims regarding the extent to which legal 
authorities determine adjudicative outcomes or constrain judicial 
behavior.13 In this Article, I will avoid most of the normative questions 
that divide realists and anti-realists in an attempt to clarify the formal 
structure of legal analysis in a model that has explanatory power 
regardless of one’s substantive views or normative commitments 
regarding the nature of adjudication. As we will see, however, this 
purely formal model lends some support to realist claims regarding the 
indeterminacy of legal rules and to positivist claims regarding the 
primacy of practice in determining what a society’s law is. 
My formal model will be built upon a particular vocabulary. In 
philosophy, logic, and mathematics, category definition is the province 
of set theory. Thus, if categories truly do play an important role in legal 
analysis, the tools of set theory may fruitfully be applied to the 
relationship between legal rules and particular cases, and ultimately to 
the relationships among legal rules themselves. For these purposes, a 
“rule” is any legal directive, formulated at any level of precision or 
generality, that purports to direct the behavior of actors within a legal 
 
 11 ERNEST NAGEL & JAMES R. NEWMAN, GÖDEL’S PROOF 26 (Douglas R. Hofstadter ed., rev. 
ed. 2001). 
 12 Compare BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF 
POLITICS IN JUDGING (2010), with Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What Is the 
Issue?, 16 LEGAL THEORY 111 (2010). 
 13 See generally Leiter, supra note 12. 
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system.14 A “case” is any state of the world that has generated a legal 
dispute subject to evaluation within that legal system. In this way of 
thinking, what lawyers describe as “application of law to facts” is best 
understood as evaluation of the set-theoretic concept of membership or 
belonging: whether a particular state of the world can be situated within 
a category defined by a relevant legal rule. 
Starting with this foundational notion of the relationship between 
rules and cases, I construct in this Article a set-theoretic and purely 
formal model of the structure of legal doctrine in a common-law system. 
In doing so I will rely primarily (though not exclusively) on examples 
from my own fields of substantive expertise: property and intellectual 
property (IP) law. For example: whether or not a transferee of a 
leasehold interest can be held directly liable to the original lessor for 
failure to pay rent often depends on whether the transfer falls into the 
category of “assignment” or the category of “sublease.” Which of those 
two categories any particular transfer falls into typically depends, in 
turn, on whether the instrument of transfer provides for the original 
lessee to retain any part of the leasehold interest.15 This set of rules can 
be formalized and related to one another in an overarching structure via 
the set-theoretic relations of membership and inclusion—as I will 
illustrate below.16  
Moreover, as we will see, in common-law systems this structure is 
recursive: rules inform the disposition of cases, while the dispositions of 
cases collectively and inductively inform the development of new rules 
over time. Conceiving of legal doctrine in terms of sets, rather than 
propositions, allows a clearer understanding of the dynamic process by 
which the practices of legal actors generate the development and 
modification of legal directives. And importantly, it reveals how certain 
 
 14 The word “rule” here is thus not intended to reflect the particular meaning of the word 
“rule” in contrast with the word “standard” as the dichotomy is typically framed in legal theory; 
I discuss the relationship between my set-theoretic model and the rules/standards dichotomy 
(including the dimensions of precision and generality) in Section IV.B, infra.  
 15 See, e.g., Thomas v. United States, 505 F.2d 1282, 1286 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (quoting Haynes v. 
Eagle-Picher Co., 295 F.2d 761, 763 (10th Cir. 1961)); Duck Creek Tire Serv., Inc. v. Goodyear 
Corners, L.C., 796 N.W.2d 886, 893 (Iowa 2011); Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 73 
P.2d 1163, 1168 (1937).  
 16 See infra Section II.A. 
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dynamics of doctrinal change emerge predictably from the structure of a 
common-law system, rather than the substance of particular rules. 
Formalization along these lines is the key to my second claim: that 
understanding the structure of legal analysis in terms of set theory 
reveals subtle formal distinctions in the behavioral strategies legal actors 
may deploy when faced with underdeterminate (or contradictory) legal 
rules. Thus, regardless of their substantive conclusions regarding the 
outcome of a particular case, and indeed independently of the 
justification for that outcome, legal actors will often have the freedom to 
implement their conclusion in a number of formally distinguishable 
ways. Distinctions among these strategies map directly to distinctions 
between the set-theoretic relations of membership and inclusion. We 
will see that the choice of a formal strategy has important implications 
for the claims made by any particular act of advocacy or adjudication 
against the body of doctrine within which it is situated. 
Understanding these formal distinctions in the behavior of legal 
actors leads to my third claim: that important objects of study and 
debate in substantive legal theory—such as the distinction between rules 
and standards, the nature of precedent, and the problem of judicial 
discretion—are emergent properties of the set-theoretic structure within 
which legal practice operates: a system of cases categorized according to 
multiple, overlapping rules. In short, the logical structure of the 
relationship between rules and cases is what generates some of our most 
persistent jurisprudential concerns. These concerns are emergent 
features of the system’s most elementary structures. 
To be clear: I intend to demonstrate that a set-theoretic model of 
the structure of legal systems is extremely useful in understanding those 
systems, but I do not claim—nor do I in fact believe—that set theory can 
provide a complete model of legal systems, nor that it can answer all the 
important questions in legal theory or jurisprudence. I am not here 
making a claim about what law is in any metaphysical sense, about what 
makes it law as opposed to something else, about the appropriate scope 
of precedent, about the appropriate degree of constraint or discretion 
for judges, about the sources of normative content that do or should 
guide judicial decision-making, about law’s relation to morality or to 
tradition, or any similar jurisprudential concern. Nor do I intend to 
defend any claim about the proper interpretation of legal texts or any 
other prescriptive theory of adjudication. On the contrary, my point is 
merely that the logical structure of legal doctrine necessarily implies 
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certain behavioral options in the context of specific legal disputes, and 
that these options are in fact independent of any such substantive or 
normative concerns—that they emerge from the structure of the legal 
system itself. 
These claims, though modest, fill an unfortunate gap in the 
literature. There has never been an effort to formalize legal reasoning 
along the lines I attempt in this Article. This may be because the 
theoretical tools I will rely on were just gaining traction in philosophy at 
roughly the same time the American Legal Realists launched their 
program against formalist models of adjudication,17 and have since been 
largely abandoned to mathematicians as twentieth-century philosophy 
took its linguistic turn.18 Today, the formal logic of legal systems is a 
subject that is mainly of interest to philosophers,19 to those interested in 
the possibility of representing legal reasoning using the tools of artificial 
 
 17 For example, when Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica was first published, 
Jerome Frank was already a law student on his way to private practice. Compare Frank, Jerome 
New, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/frank-jerome-new [https://perma.cc/
TC5Q-PX6K] (last visited Mar. 26, 2019), with Andrew David Irvine, Principia Mathematica, 
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/principia-
mathematica [https://perma.cc/ZXN4-NA96] (last updated Mar. 10, 2015). By the time the 
disciplines of philosophy and mathematics had sufficiently digested the Principia to generate 
Gödel’s breakthroughs, Karl Llewellyn and Max Radin were busy advancing the Realist 
program from perches on prominent law school faculties. See generally, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, 
A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930); Max Radin, Statutory 
Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930). Indeed, when Radin refers to the “determinables” 
and “determinates” of W. E. Johnson’s Logic, in his disquisition on statutory interpretation, he 
is unwittingly relying on a philosopher whose efforts were soon to be overtaken by the system 
of Russell and Whitehead (and by the increasingly formal logics that followed), in keeping with 
the more general movement of the study of logic from philosophers to mathematicians. See id. 
at 868–70; JOHN PASSMORE, A HUNDRED YEARS OF PHILOSOPHY 343–45, 394 (2d ed. 1966). 
 18 The “linguistic turn” is a term of art in intellectual history and refers to an increased 
focus in post-war analytic (i.e., Anglo-American) philosophy on the philosophy of language, for 
which first-order symbolic logic of the type relied on in this Article was quickly deemed 
unsuitable. The term itself was popularized in THE LINGUISTIC TURN: ESSAYS IN 
PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD (Richard M. Rorty ed., 1992). See generally Peter M.S. Hacker, The 
Linguistic Turn in Analytic Philosophy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF 
ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY 926 (Michael Beaney ed., 2013). 
 19 See generally, e.g., Carlos E. Alchourrón, On Law and Logic, 9 RATIO JURIS 331 (1996); 
Richard Holton, Modeling Legal Rules, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE 
LAW 165 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011). 
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intelligence,20 and to scholars in the code-based civil law tradition21—
with some notable and worthy exceptions.22 But lawyers and common-
law legal scholars can benefit from greater attention to the common law 
as a distinctive logical system.  
One important area of application is in legal education. The model 
developed in this paper will be useful to legal educators and law 
students, as a guide to the types of analytical moves that are part of 
“thinking like a lawyer.” For law students who tend to think graphically 
or spatially, in particular, the familiar graphical representations of sets 
in Venn diagrams is likely to be a particular aid to understanding and 
mastery of legal habits of mind such as analogy and distinction, the 
extraction of rules from cases, and the flexible scope of rule-application. 
Second, the tools of set theory are also of use to the practicing lawyer, 
judge, and legal commentator, because they offer a more precise 
vocabulary for identifying and critiquing poor legal reasoning that the 
typical rhetorical approach may gloss over. Finally, the set-theoretic 
model I will develop here has implications for legal theory, where heated 
substantive debates often leave important formal ambiguities 
 
 20 See generally, e.g., Carlos E. Alchourrón, Philosophical Foundations of Deontic Logic and 
the Logic of Defeasible Conditionals, in DEONTIC LOGIC IN COMPUTER SCIENCE: NORMATIVE 
SYSTEM SPECIFICATION 43 (John-Jules Ch. Meyer & Roel J. Wieringa eds., 1993); John F. Horty 
& Trevor J.M. Bench-Capon, A Factor-Based Definition of Precedential Constraint, 20 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 181 (2012); Henry Prakken, Logical Tools for Modelling Legal 
Argument: A Study of Defeasible Reasoning in Law, 64 STUDIA LOGICA: AN INT’L J. FOR 
SYMBOLIC LOGIC 143 (2000). 
 21 For example, one recent compilation of essays (in English) on legal logic included 
contributions from twenty-four authors, only six of whom are from common-law countries. 
THE LOGIC OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS: ESSAYS ON DEFEASIBILITY, at xi (Jordi Ferrer Beltrán & 
Giovanni Battista Ratti eds., 2012). See also, e.g., NAVARRO & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 7 
(Argentinian authors); Jaap Hage, Law, Logic and Defeasibility, 11 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & 
L. 221 (2003) (Dutch author). 
 22 See generally Horty & Bench-Capon, supra note 20; Henry Prakken & Giovanni Sartor, 
Modelling Reasoning with Precedents in a Formal Dialogue Game, in JUDICIAL APPLICATIONS 
OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 127 (Giovanni Sartor & Karl Branting eds., 1998). One leading 
American scholar of legal logic, Sara Lawsky, not coincidentally works primarily in the heavily 
codified field of tax law. See generally, e.g., Sarah B. Lawsky, A Logic for Statutes, 21 FLA. TAX 
REV. 60 (2017). Other innovative scholarship has focused on the potential of non-classical 
logics to illuminate particular aspects of legal reasoning such as fact-finding. See generally, e.g., 
Kevin M. Clermont, Conjunction of Evidence and Multivalent Logic, in LAW AND THE NEW 
LOGICS 32 (H. Patrick Glenn & Lionel D. Smith eds., 2017); Vern R. Walker, A Default-Logic 
Paradigm for Legal Fact-Finding, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 193 (2007). 
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unexamined. Not only can the set-theoretic model help cut through 
those ambiguities, but it also shows how some of these substantive 
debates are actually generated by inescapable structural features of law 
as a social practice. 
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief overview 
of naïve set theory for those unfamiliar with it, introducing the 
terminology and concepts that will be deployed in the analysis that 
follows; those who feel comfortable with the concepts and notation 
systems of set theory and predicate logic may skim or skip this section. 
Parts II and III build the scaffolding of a set-theoretic model of law. Part 
II demonstrates how the tools of set theory can be deployed to analyze 
the relationship between rules and cases, and how legal doctrines can be 
modeled using set-theoretic concepts. Part III demonstrates more 
complex interactions of rules and cases, focusing on “hard cases” in 
which multiple applicable legal rules appear to contradict one another. 
This Part provides a more thorough description of the strategies legal 
actors can use to resolve such doctrinal conflicts at various levels of 
formal structure. Part IV discusses some implications and limitations of 
a set-theoretic understanding of legal doctrine, including its interaction 
with other aspects of legal theory. 
I.     NAÏVE SET THEORY: A PRIMER 
Most people who have any degree of legal education will have at 
least a passing familiarity with the concept of sets—if for no other 
reason than because they are a staple of primary and secondary school 
mathematics, where they are the stuff of hazily remembered Venn 
diagrams. Sets are a pillar of modern mathematics: Axiomatic set theory 
is the basis for rigorous definitions of numbers, for setting up the rules 
of arithmetic and higher mathematics, for describing the nature of 
mathematical functions and geometry, and for constructing the types of 
abstract analyses of which modern mathematical proofs are made.23 
Fortunately, we require a far lesser degree of rigor to make sets useful 
for the analysis of legal doctrine. We will confine ourselves here to so-
 
 23 See generally JOSÉ FERREIRÓS, LABYRINTH OF THOUGHT: A HISTORY OF SET THEORY AND 
ITS ROLE IN MODERN MATHEMATICS (1999).  
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called “naïve” set theory of the type that one might encounter in an 
undergraduate, or even a high school, course—though some useful 
axioms will be introduced in a very informal way where appropriate. 
This Part also makes use of the standard notation system of predicate 
logic, familiarity with which is assumed. 
A.     Membership, Construction, Equality, and Inclusion 
A “set” was defined by Georg Cantor as “any collection into a 
whole M of definite and separate objects m of our intuition or our 
thought. These objects are called the ‘elements’ of M.”24 The relationship 
between a set and its elements—the relation of belonging or 
membership—is the most primitive relation in set theory,25 and is the 
most important aspect of the theory for our purposes. For any given set 
A and one of its members x, we may say: “x is an element of A” or, in 
formal notation: 
x ∈ A 
Using this basic relation of membership, we can “construct” sets 
using at least two strategies. First, we can define a set by simply listing 
its elements. For example, as of this writing the set J of all active United 
States Supreme Court Justices is a finite set consisting of the following 
nine elements: Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, Justice Ginsburg, 
Justice Breyer, Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, Justice 
Gorsuch, and Justice Kavanaugh. We can formally define such a finite 
set extensionally: that is, we can define the set according to its elements 
merely by listing each and every one of those elements, i.e.: 
 
 24 GEORG CANTOR, CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FOUNDING OF THE THEORY OF TRANSFINITE 
NUMBERS 85 (Philip E. B. Jourdain trans., 1915). This definition was later found to be 
insufficient to ground a coherent set theory free of logical paradoxes (see note 28, infra), 
causing thinkers such as Zermelo, Russell, Quine, von Neumann, Gödel, Fraenkel, and others 
to refine the theory of sets to avoid such paradoxes. These refinements are the basis of 
axiomatic set theory, which is of great interest to mathematicians, computer scientists, and 
logicians, but of little use to the present project. A. A. FRAENKEL ET AL., FOUNDATIONS OF SET 
THEORY 22–28 (J. Barwise et al. eds, 2d rev. ed. 1973). 
 25 PAUL R. HALMOS, NAIVE SET THEORY 2 (1960). 
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J = {Roberts, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, 
Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh} 
This method of construction gives us occasion to invoke an 
important axiom: the axiom of extensionality, which provides the basis 
for the definition of the equality relation between sets. The axiom of 
extensionality specifies that sets are defined according to their extension 
(i.e., the full list of their elements), and therefore two sets are equal to 
each other if and only if they have exactly the same elements.26  
Extensional definition is obviously cumbersome for all but the 
smallest sets, and it is not especially informative regarding the qualities 
of the sets so defined. A more useful and parsimonious construction of a 
set of interest would invoke some common characteristic(s) that the 
elements of the set share, which distinguishes them from all other things 
we might have in mind that are not elements of the set. Here, an 
intensional definition of the set of interest—call this set J1—is needed. 
To build such a definition, we require some predicate statement 
concerning members of our set that identifies them and distinguishes 
them from other objects. Our earlier casual definition, “the set of all 
active United States Supreme Court Justices,” suggests a useful 
predicate. We can define J1 as the set of all objects x such that x is an 
active United States Supreme Court Justice. In formal notation: 
J1 = {x: x is an active United States Supreme Court Justice} 
Or, alternatively, using a predicate symbol to express our 
intensional definition: 
P(x) = x is an active United States Supreme Court Justice 
J1 = {x: P(x)} 
Note that once this predicate is evaluated against objects in the 
world and the resulting list of elements of J1 is fully extended, those 
elements will be exactly the same as the previously enumerated elements 
of J according to our extensional definition of J. Therefore, according to 
our definition of the equality relation between sets pursuant to the 
axiom of extensionality: 
 
 26 FRAENKEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 22–28. Formally, using the notation system of first-
order logic, we may state the axiom of extensionality thus:  
∀𝐴 ∀𝐵 [∀𝑥(𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 ↔𝑥 ∈ 𝐵)→𝐴=𝐵] 
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J1 = J 
Some important features of our methods for constructing these sets 
bear mention. First, it should be apparent that our intensional definition 
of J1 implies many other definitional statements that might be useful for 
distinguishing objects of study from one another. For example, the fact 
that x is a Supreme Court Justice implies that x is a human being, that x 
is a judge, that x is a federal judge, that x is an Article III federal judge. 
We may or may not need to make these implicit definitions explicit, 
depending on what the purpose of our analysis is. If we are interested in 
understanding the set of Supreme Court Justices in relation to other 
Article III judges, we might explicitly confine our analysis to Article III 
judges and define our sets as collections of objects from that larger 
group. For any given analysis, we can call the group of all objects that 
are candidates for inclusion in or exclusion from sets the universe of 
discourse.27  
Second, it should be clear that this understanding of the universe of 
discourse also defines a set. That is, the universe of discourse is a set of 
all objects that may come under consideration in a given analysis.28 By 
 
 27 GEORGE BOOLE, AN INVESTIGATION OF THE LAWS OF THOUGHT, ON WHICH ARE 
FOUNDED THE MATHEMATICAL THEORIES OF LOGIC AND PROBABILITIES 42 (1854) (“In every 
discourse, whether of the mind conversing with its own thoughts, or of the individual in his 
intercourse with others, there is an assumed or expressed limit within which the subjects of its 
operation are confined. . . . Now, whatever may be the extent of the field within which all the 
objects of our discourse are found, that field may properly be termed the universe of 
discourse.”). 
 28 Understood at its most capacious and abstract, a universal set can pose fundamental 
challenges to the coherence of set theory. For example, if defined as “the set of all possible 
things,” U also by definition contains all sets containing members of U, and also contains U 
itself. This inherent self-reference leads to the potential for logical paradoxes, or “antinomies,” 
that arise from infinite recursion. The most famous of these is Russell’s Paradox, which posits 
the existence of a set composed of all sets that are not members of themselves. Such a set would 
be a member of itself if and only if it were not a member of itself—a logical contradiction. See 
BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PRINCIPLES OF MATHEMATICS 101–03 (1996). But nothing in naïve set 
theory would seem to preclude an intensional definition of a set based on such an infinitely 
recursive predicate (i.e., that the set is a member of itself). The decline of Cantor’s naïve set 
theory, and the rise in the twentieth century of axiomatic theories that disclaim the existence of 
any truly Universal set, is a product of the effort to avoid this type of paradox.  
  Fortunately, for our purposes, we are not attempting to build an internally consistent 
system of logic or provide an axiomatic framework for all of mathematics, and we are not 
interested in plumbing the nature of infinity or of the set of all possible sets. We are instead 
merely using the language of sets as a convenient shorthand for the logical relationships 
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convention, we will call this universal set U. So, for our sets J and J1 
above, the universal set U might be defined as the set of all human 
beings, or of all judges, or of all federal judges, or of all Article III federal 
judges, depending on what universe of discourse we are trying to make 
meaningful statements about. 
This leads us to a third important relation in naïve set theory: the 
relation of inclusion, which is based on the concept of the subset, 
indicated by the symbol ⊆. Let us say—by way of definition—that a set 
A is a subset of another set B where each and every element of A is also 
an element of B. We may also say, conversely, that the set B includes its 
subset A.29 
Under this definition of inclusion, B may well have elements in 
addition to the elements of A, but it need not. Sets that are equal to one 
another are also subsets of one another, and every set is a subset of 
itself.30 Furthermore, it should be apparent that the relation of inclusion 
is transitive: that is, if A is a subset of B and B is a subset of C, then A is 
necessarily a subset of C.31 Finally, it should be apparent that, whatever 
our universe of discourse, any set we define within that universe will by 
definition be included in, and therefore a subset of, the universal set U. 
We can now move from the fundamental relations of membership, 
equality, and inclusion to some other set theoretical concepts of interest 
to the current project. Chief among these are union, intersection, 
 
between certain clearly-defined objects of our interest and study, and the nature of our inquiry 
is such that we can define those objects and relationships in such a way as to avoid these 
paradoxes. In technical terms, we will take care to avoid any impredicative definitions of our 
sets, including our universal sets. See id.; see also FRAENKEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 38 (“A 
definition of a set is called impredicative if it contains a reference to a totality to which the set 
itself belongs.”). We will leave the formal objections to naïve set theory to the philosophers and 
mathematicians. 
 29 FRAENKEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 26. Formally, the relation of inclusion is defined as 
follows: 
∀𝐴 ∀𝐵 [∀𝑥(𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 →𝑥 ∈ 𝐵) → 𝐴 ⊆ 𝐵] 
 30 Id. A subset that is not equal to the set that includes it is sometimes referred to as a 
proper subset, but the distinction between a subset and a proper subset is not particularly useful 
to this Article. 
 31 That is, each and every element of A is an element of B, and each and every element of B 
is an element of C, meaning that each and every element of A must also be an element of C. 
Formally: 
[(𝐴 ⊆ 𝐵) ∧ (B ⊆ C)] → (𝐴 ⊆ C) 
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difference, and complementation; analysis of these operations will yield 
an understanding of disjointness, and of the null set. 
B.     Set Algebra 
Sets can be the subject of mathematical and logical operations that 
make them useful analytical tools. Among these, the more interesting 
for our purposes have to do with the relationships between sets. 
1.     Union and Intersection; Disjointness and the Null Set 
The union of two sets A and B, indicated by the symbol ⋃, is 
defined as the set (call it C) containing all objects that are elements of 
either A or B or both.32 The union operation may be analogized to 
addition in arithmetic, or to disjunction in sentential logic. We may 
illustrate the concept of a union of sets graphically, using a Venn 
diagram representing the set C as a union of sets A and B:33 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 32 ABRAHAM A. FRAENKEL, ABSTRACT SET THEORY 18–20 (3d rev. ed. 1966). 
 33 We may also define the union function formally: 
C = A ⋃ B → C = {x : (x ∈A) ∨ (x ∈B)} 
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Note that any set constructed as the union of two or more other sets 
necessarily includes those other sets; i.e., the sets that are added together 
are each subsets of the sum of those sets. 
The intersection of two sets A and B, indicated by the symbol ∩, is 
defined as the set (call it I) containing all objects that are elements of 
both A and B.34 It is thus analogous to conjunction in sentential logic. 
Again, the intersection of two sets can be represented graphically:35 
Figure 2 
 
 34 FRAENKEL, supra note 32. 
 35 Again, the intersection function can also be defined formally: 
I = A ∩ B → I = {x : (x ∈ A) ∧(x ∈ B)} 
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Note that nothing about the nature of sets as we have defined them 
up to this point requires our intersection set I to have any objects in it. 
Should it be the case that A and B have no elements in common, the set 
I will have no elements: 
 
Figure 3 
 
This set with no elements is unique: By the axiom of extensionality 
all sets with the same elements are equivalent, and any set with no 
elements is therefore equivalent to every other set with no elements. 
This unique set with no elements is called the null set or empty set, and 
is denoted by the symbol Ø.36 Where, as in Figure 3, the intersection of 
two sets A and B is the null set (i.e., where A and B have no members in 
common), A and B are said to be disjoint sets.37 
 
 36 FRAENKEL, supra note 32 at 16–18. Given our definition of subsets, it follows that the null 
set is a subset of every set, including itself. Id. 
 37 FRAENKEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 30. 
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2.     Difference and Complementation 
The difference between two sets, A – B, is defined as the set of those 
members of A that are not members of B.38 As a matter of sentential 
logic, it is analogous to conjunction with a negated premise. We can 
represent this definition of set difference graphically:39 
 
Figure 4 
 
Of course, it is possible that A and B will be disjoint sets, in which 
case the difference A – B will simply be equivalent to A: 
  
 
 38 FRAENKEL, supra note 32, at 22–23. 
 39 Formally, difference is defined as follows: 
[C = A – B] → [C = {x : (x ∈ A) ∧ (x ∉ B)}] 
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Figure 5 
 
Finally, where the universe of discourse is suitably specified, any set 
A defined within the universal set U may be said to have a complement, 
which is defined as the difference between the universal set and the 
specified set, or U – A.40 Put differently, this complement is the set of all 
objects in the universe of discourse that are not elements of A. The 
complement of the set A is designated as A', such that: 
A' = U – A 
Again, we can represent this definition of complementarity graphically: 
  
 
 40 HALMOS, supra note 25, at 17–18. It is precisely because of the paradoxes discussed in 
note 28, supra, that complementation (like the universal set) is generally not well defined in 
axiomatic set theory. FRAENKEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 40–41. 
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Figure 6 
 
Having defined some basic tools of naïve set theory, we are now in 
a position to apply them to legal problems. 
II.     SETS IN LEGAL REASONING AND ANALYSIS 
We can understand legal rules to provide intensional definitions of 
sets. Such intensional definitions may operate either by inclusion or by 
exclusion—some rules tell us what is in a category, others tell us what is 
not in a category. For example, the category of legal infants is often 
framed in an inclusionary way: it consists of all natural persons who are 
younger than a certain age.41 But the category of persons with legal 
capacity to sue or be sued is usually framed in an exclusionary way: it 
 
 41 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-1d (West 2019) (“[T]he terms ‘minor’, ‘infant’ and 
‘infancy’ shall be deemed to refer to a person under the age of eighteen years . . . .”); but see 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-101 (West 2019) (“The period of minority extends in all persons to the 
age of eighteen (18) years, except that every person sixteen (16) years of age or over who is or 
has been married shall be considered of the age of majority in all matters relating to contracts, 
property rights, liabilities and the capacity to sue and be sued.”). The fact that this category 
could also be framed in exclusionary terms is an example of the binary nature of so many legal 
doctrines—an issue which will be developed more fully below. See, e.g., 23 PA. STAT. AND CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 5101 (West 2019) (“Except where otherwise provided or prescribed by law, an 
individual 18 years of age and older shall be deemed an adult . . . .”). 
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consists of all persons who are not infants, insane, incapacitated, or 
subject to some other legal disability.42 
On this understanding of the nature of legal rules, the application 
of law to facts—that inescapable and inescapably contested analytical 
process at the heart of legal systems—can be formally modeled as the 
evaluation of the fundamental set-theoretic relation of membership. 
Cases—not in the sense of “judicial opinions” or even “matters in 
litigation” but in the sense of “states of the world that have generated 
disputes subject to resolution by the legal system”—can be understood 
as objects that may or may not be elements of the sets intensionally 
defined by our legal rules. Other aspects of legal reasoning may similarly 
be modeled in set-theoretic terms. Rules may be combined (or 
reconciled) with one another using set-theoretic concepts such as union, 
subtraction, intersection, and inclusion. Finally, in the quintessential 
dynamic of common-law systems, judicial resolution of cases can, over 
time, provide extensional definitions of new legal sets, and new legal 
rules (i.e., intensional definitions) can be inferred by grouping judicial 
decisions according to their outcomes and attempting to formulate 
predicates that describe the states of the world—the cases—that 
generated those similar outcomes. In this Part, I will illustrate the use of 
set-theoretic concepts to model these basic features of legal reasoning 
and analysis. 
A.     Building Blocks: The Relationship Between Rules and Cases 
Recall that the most fundamental relation in set theory is the 
relationship between sets and elements (the relation of membership). I 
propose that the analogue to this relationship in common-law legal 
systems is the relationship between rules and cases. As every first-year 
law student learns, the real work of legal analysis comes in applying a 
rule to a set of facts that has generated a legal dispute—to a case. 
Consider the example we introduced in the Introduction to this Article: 
the distinction between an assignment and a sublease.43 Where a 
 
 42 67A C.J.S. Parties § 10 (West 2019) (“A want of capacity to sue exists where there is some 
legal disability, such as infancy, lunacy, idiocy, coverture, want of authority, or a want of title in 
plaintiff in the character in which he or she sues.”). 
 43 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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transferee of some interest under a lease breaches some covenant of the 
lease agreement, the landlord under the primary lease may attempt to 
obtain monetary relief (as distinct from possession) directly against the 
breaching transferee. Whether such direct relief is available depends on 
whether the primary landlord and the transferee are “in privity,” and 
this, in turn, depends on whether the transfer at issue is categorized as a 
“sublease” or an “assignment.” Simplified somewhat, an assignment 
puts the original lessor and the transferee in privity of estate (and thus 
makes the transferee directly answerable to the original lessor in an 
action for damages); a sublease does not.44 The hornbook rule for 
distinguishing among these two types of transfer is as follows: 
An assignment of a term for years occurs where the lessee transfers 
his or her entire interest therein, for the unexpired remainder of the 
term created by the lease, without retaining any reversionary 
interest. . . . A sublease occurs where a lessee underlets the premises 
or a part thereof to a third person for a period less than the lessee’s 
term. If the lessee reserves a reversionary interest in the term, it 
constitutes a sublease, no matter how small the reversion and 
regardless of the form of the instrument.45 
Thus, in any given action for damages brought by a landlord 
against a transferee of a leasehold interest, the possible outcomes are—at 
least at one level—binary: the landlord-plaintiff either can recover or 
cannot recover against the transferee-defendant. Which of these two 
binary outcomes will result from any particular set of facts depends on 
categorization of the instrument by which the particular transferee 
acquired her interest as either an assignment or a sublease. In short, the 
state of the world that generated the dispute must be placed into one of 
the categories defined by the hornbook rule. 
 
 44 See 52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 62 (West 2019) (“Since there is neither privity of 
contract nor privity of estate between the two, a subtenant normally owes no responsibility to 
the original lessor, and the original lessor has no direct action with respect to the covenants in 
the original lease as against the sublessee.”); 52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 54 (West 2019) 
(“When a lease is transferred by assignment, privity of estate ends between the lessor and lessee 
and is created between the lessor and the assignee, who becomes bound by covenants running 
with the land.”). 
 45 52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 43 (West 2019). 
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Some examples clarify this relationship between rules and cases. In 
Berg v. Ridgway,46 the plaintiff landlords sued the third successive 
transferee of a ground lease for unpaid sums due under the primary 
ground lease agreement with the original tenant. The defendant had 
taken possession of the leased premises pursuant to a partnership 
dissolution agreement whereby the partnership—itself a prior assignee 
of the lease—agreed to “transfer, sell, assign and convey all right title 
and interest . . . to the” defendant, who agreed to “purchase[] and 
accept[] such transfer, assignment and conveyance.”47 The defendant 
claimed that he could not be held directly liable, based on language in 
the original lease governing the liability of subtenants. But because the 
dissolved partnership had retained no interest in the leased premises, 
the court held that the transfer to the defendant was an assignment, not 
a sublease, making the defendant directly liable to the original lessor for 
performance of the lease covenants (and thus for damages) 
notwithstanding the language in the primary lease.48 
By way of contrast, in Dunlap v. Bullard,49 the defendant’s 
predecessor acquired an interest in an existing lease via an instrument 
that provided he was “to hold for a term equal to the whole of the 
unexpired term of the original lease,” but also providing that the 
transferor “might enter and take possession for breach of covenant,” 
and that the transferee “would quit and deliver up the premises to the 
lessor at the end of the term.”50 The original lessor sued to recover for 
unpaid taxes that were the responsibility of the tenant under the 
primary lease. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ordered 
judgment for the defendant, reasoning that the reservation by the 
transferee of a right to retake possession was inconsistent with an 
assignment, insofar as it indicated “that the parties to this lease intended 
to create the relation of landlord and tenant between themselves”—that 
is, to create a sublease.51 
 
 46 140 N.W.2d 95 (Iowa 1966). 
 47 Id. at 97. 
 48 Id. at 100. 
 49 131 Mass. 161 (1881). 
 50 Id. at 161. 
 51 Id. at 162–63. 
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As before, we can build a set-theoretic model of the doctrines in 
this area, either formulaically or graphically. First, we can conceive of 
the universe of discourse as divided into two complementary sets 
corresponding to the possible outcomes—intensionally defined as 
judgment for plaintiff and judgment for the defendant. Let π be the set 
of cases wherein a court enters judgment for the plaintiff and ∆ be the 
set of cases wherein a court enters judgment for the defendant. Next, we 
can intensionally define two sets predicated by our hornbook rules: let A 
(for “assignment”) be the set of cases wherein the transferor has 
conveyed her entire interest in a lease, and let S (for “sublease”) be the 
set of cases wherein the transferor has conveyed less than her entire 
interest in a lease. Because our hornbook rule tells us that the predicates 
of the sets A and S determine the appropriate judicial resolution of a 
legal dispute, we know they must have some relation to our universe-
exhausting complementary sets π and ∆. In particular, we know that any 
case within set S will—under the rules we have so far discussed—result 
in a judgment for the defendant, while any set of facts that falls within 
set A will result in a judgment for the plaintiff. Thus, any element of S 
will also be an element of ∆, while any element of A will also be an 
element of π. In other words, S must be a subset of ∆, and A must be a 
subset of π. 
We cannot treat our legal-rule-defined sets as equal to our 
universe-exhausting complements for a very important reason: legal 
rules and inferences are generally defeasible.52 That is, it may be that 
there are other legal rules that might be brought to bear on a particular 
case that would play a more important role in determining which of our 
two binary outcomes is required in any particular case. We will consider 
that possibility—and the ways in which it may alter a set-theoretic 
model of a legal universe of discourse—in the following Section. 
Before reaching that point, we need to incorporate actual cases into 
our model. If, as posited above, we should treat the states of the world 
 
 52 For theoretical approaches to the logical concept of defeasibility and its role in legal 
reasoning, see generally THE LOGIC OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS: ESSAYS ON DEFEASIBILITY (Jordi 
Ferrer Beltrán & Giovanni Battista Ratti eds., 2012); Giovanni Sartor, Defeasibility in Legal 
Reasoning, in INFORMATICS AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL REASONING 119 (1995); Henry 
Prakken & Giovanni Sartor, The Three Faces of Defeasibility in the Law, 17 RATIO JURIS 118 
(2004); Richard H. S. Tur, Defeasibilism, 21 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 355 (2001); John L. 
Pollock, Defeasible Reasoning, 11 COGNITIVE SCI. 481 (1987). 
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that generated the two judicial opinions discussed in this Section as 
objects that can be elements of sets in our universe of discourse, we must 
incorporate the cases into the model using the relation of membership. 
Let b stand for Berg v. Ridgway, and let d stand for Dunlap v. Bullard. 
We know that Berg was found to involve an assignment, and thus 
resulted in judgment for the plaintiff; we can therefore say that b is an 
element of set A and therefore—by inclusion—of set π. Similarly, we 
know that Dunlap was found to involve a sublease, and thus resulted in 
judgment for the defendant. We can therefore say that d is an element of 
set S and therefore—by inclusion—of set ∆. 
This gives us sufficient material to construct the simplest possible 
model of a legal universe of discourse: a pair of rule-predicated sets 
mapping to a binary outcome that exhausts the possible resolution of 
cases that fall within the universe, with two exemplar cases as elements 
of our two rule-based sets. With all the pieces in place, we can represent 
this universe of discourse graphically: 
 
Figure 7 
 
If all legal doctrines were this simple, modeling them with set 
theory would seem to be more trouble than it is worth. But as any 
lawyer—or law student—knows (and as the rest of this Article will 
explore), legal rules typically interact in more complex ways. And set 
theory is a powerful tool for understanding that complexity by 
constructing a model of the relevant universe of discourse that organizes 
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the complex facts of real-world cases into comprehensible—if not 
entirely stable—categories. 
B.     More Complex Doctrines and Their Set-Theoretic Relations 
1.     Union and Subtraction: Overlapping Rules 
We can begin to complicate the picture without leaving the law of 
subleases and assignments. Recall that in the previous Section we 
refrained from treating the legal-rule-defined sets S and A as equal to 
the universe-exhausting complements ∆ and π because of the 
defeasibility of legal conclusions: It is possible that other legal rules 
might compel a particular outcome in a particular case notwithstanding 
the application of the rule regarding assignments and subleases. Our 
first example of the interaction of multiple legal rules involves one such 
additional rule: the rule regarding assumption of a primary lease by a 
transferee.  
Recall that assignments render transferees liable to the original 
lessor while subleases do not because of the common-law requirement 
of privity—satisfied in the case of assignments by the notion of privity of 
estate.53 But the common law developed another theory by which the 
lessor could hold the transferee directly liable for damages: if a 
transferee agreed to be bound to the covenants of a primary lease, that 
would make the lessor under that primary lease a third-party beneficiary 
of the transfer agreement, and thus create privity of contract between the 
lessor and the transferee.54 Indeed, this theory was available—though 
superfluous—in Berg v. Ridgway.55 
 
 53 Berg, 140 N.W.2d at 99–100. 
 54 The hornbooks recite this principle in the context of assignments, where it is far more 
commonly applied: “[I]n cases in which the assignee expressly assumes the lessee’s obligations 
under the lease, he or she may be bound to the lessor under privity of contract principles even 
where the lessor is not a party to the assignment.” 52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 54 (West 
2019). 
 55 140 N.W.2d at 100 (“The trial court could find defendant had agreed to perform all the 
provisions of the lease during the period of his occupancy.”). 
Sheff.40.5.9 (Do Not Delete) 7/15/2019  4:26 PM 
2019] LEGAL SETS 2055 
A third case provides an example. In Hartman Ranch Co. v. 
Associated Oil Co.,56 Hartman Ranch executed an oil and gas lease to 
Joseph Dabney.57 Dabney later executed an instrument—to which 
Hartman was not a party—transferring Dabney’s interest under the 
lease for the same term to Associated Oil.58 Hartman subsequently 
alleged a breach by Associated of an implied covenant in the primary 
lease to Dabney and sued for damages in the form of unpaid royalties.59 
The transfer from Dabney to Associated “gave Dabney and his 
associates a right of re-entry for breach of any stipulation therein.”60 
According to the “Massachusetts Rule” applied in Dunlap, then, the 
transfer from Dabney to Associated Oil was a sublease rather than an 
assignment—Dabney had reserved a right to retake possession in the 
instrument of transfer.61 This might have resolved the case in favor of 
the transferee, Associated. But the transfer instrument also “contained 
an express promise whereby defendant assumed the parent Hartman 
lease,”62 and the California Supreme Court held that this covenant put 
Hartman and Associated into privity of contract through a third-party 
beneficiary relationship.63 Thus, Hartman was permitted to recover 
damages against Associated on a contract—as opposed to a property—
theory.64 
Hartman requires some revision of our set-theoretic model of the 
law of sublease and assignment. There are now two types of facts that 
will allow for a plaintiff’s recovery: either an assignment, or an 
assumption of the primary lease by the transferee. And whether or not 
the transferee has assumed the primary lease is a fact that is independent 
of the categorization of the transfer as a sublease or assignment: either 
form of transfer might or might not include such an assumption of 
covenants. We can model this slightly more complex universe of 
discourse by invoking additional set-theoretic concepts.  
 
 56 73 P.2d 1163 (Cal. 1937). 
 57 Id. at 1166. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 1165–66 
 60 Id. at 1168. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id.  
 64 Id. at 1169–71. 
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Let us identify a new set T, as the set of all cases in which a 
transferee of a leasehold interest assumes the covenants of the primary 
lease. Because assumption of the primary lease by the transferee 
provides an independent basis for a plaintiff’s recovery, we know that T 
will be a subset of π. And because we know that either an assignment or 
an assumption of the primary lease will provide a basis for the plaintiff 
to recover, we can identify the relationship between sets A, T, and π with 
the logical operation of disjunction—which as previously discussed,65 
relates to the set-algebraic operation of union: 
(A ⋃ T) ⊆ π 
Indeed, assuming we have now identified and modeled all the legal 
rules applicable to the universe of discourse, and that these rules exhaust 
the relevant universe of discourse (which we will do here for simplicity’s 
sake), we can simply posit: 
π = (A ⋃ T) 
Finally, we can identify all remaining cases in our simplified 
universe of discourse—which, given our assumptions, is simply the 
universe of all cases in which a landlord is seeking to recover damages 
directly from a transferee of a primary lease—as subleases in which the 
subtenant has not assumed the covenants of the primary lease. The 
logical form of this construction—conjunction with a negated 
premise—is, as we have previously noted,66 analogous to the set-
algebraic operation of subtraction: 
∆ = (S – T) 
We can now re-evaluate our cases for membership in the sets 
intensionally defined by our three legal rules. We need to know whether 
each of our three cases involves a sublease or an assignment, and we also 
need to know whether the transferee assumed the primary lease in each 
case. Given the discussion above we know that Dunlap and Hartman 
involved subleases while Berg involved an assignment; we also know 
that the transferee assumed the primary lease in Berg and Hartman but 
not in Dunlap. Let h represent Hartman, just as b and d represent Berg 
 
 65 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 66 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
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and Dunlap, respectively. We can say that b is an element of sets A and 
T but not of set S, that d is an element of set S but not of sets A or T, and 
that h is an element of sets S and T but not of set S. With these 
membership relations in place, and given the previously described 
relationships between the sets in our universe of discourse, we can now 
represent our universe of discourse graphically: 
 
Figure 8 
 
The use of union and subtraction to organize multiple applicable 
legal rules is the simplest means of resolving potential conflicts between 
such rules. But as Part III will demonstrate, it is not the only way of 
doing so. Moreover, the different strategies for resolving such conflicts 
are intimately related to the process of common-law doctrinal 
development. But before exploring these strategies, we must first 
examine the role of sets in other aspects of legal analysis. 
2.     Inclusion: Special Circumstances, Included Offenses, Remedies 
Enhancements 
In building our first models of legal doctrine using set-theoretic 
tools we conceived of the sets predicated by legal rules as subsets of our 
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ultimate sets of interest: the complementary sets defining a binary 
outcome of adjudication. This is a key role for the relation of inclusion 
in set-theoretic models of legal doctrines, and one which we will 
examine more fully in the following Part. But subsets—and the relation 
of inclusion—can play other roles in basic legal analysis as well. The 
nesting of legal categories within one another, according to the relation 
of inclusion, is characteristic of all legal rules regarding special 
circumstances that select a specific outcome within a more general class 
of related outcomes. For example: in civil cases, remedies enhancements 
may be triggered in a subset of cases that entitle the plaintiff to some 
recovery.67  
Other legal doctrines that define questions of degree similarly rest 
on the logic of inclusion. Consider the grading of crimes under the 
Model Penal Code. We can take property crimes as an example. In 
general, “[a] person is guilty of theft if he unlawfully takes, or exercises 
unlawful control over, movable property of another with purpose to 
deprive him thereof.”68 But once the elements of the crime of theft are 
established (an issue we will deal with in the next Section), the grade of 
the crime will depend on other additional facts that may or may not be 
proven in a particular case. Thus, theft of property with value of less 
than $50, achieved without breach of fiduciary duty, threat, or taking 
from the person of the victim, is a petty misdemeanor. Theft of property 
with value exceeding $500, or of a firearm, or of a motor-propelled 
vehicle is a third-degree felony. All other theft is a misdemeanor.69 We 
can understand each of the grades of theft under the Model Penal Code 
as a subset of the crime of theft. 
Again, we can express these relations both formally and 
graphically. Consider a universe of discourse consisting of states of the 
world in which a criminal defendant has committed the crime of theft. 
Within this universe of discourse, we can define subsets of our universal 
set according to the various facts that go not to the commission of the 
crime, but to its degree: 
 
 67 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2010) (providing statutory damages of up to $30,000 per 
work for copyright infringement, but increasing this maximum to $150,000 where the 
infringement is willful). 
 68 MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.2(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 1962). 
 69 MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1(2)(a)–(b) (AM. LAW. INST. 1962). 
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A = {x: x is a theft of property with value between $50 and $500} 
B = {x: x is a theft achieved by breach of fiduciary duty} 
C = {x: x is a theft achieved by threat} 
D = {x: x is a theft achieved by taking from the person of the victim} 
E = {x: x is a theft of property with value exceeding $500} 
F = {x: x is a theft of a firearm} 
G = {x: x is a theft of a motor-propelled vehicle} 
 
We can also define the degrees of theft as sets in their own right: 
M = {x: x is a misdemeanor theft} 
N = {x: x is a third-degree felony theft} 
P = {x: x is a petty misdemeanor theft} 
The relationships among all the sets we have defined, both between each 
other and in relation to the universal set U, are best modeled with the 
set-theoretic relation of inclusion. Based on the text of the Model Penal 
Code, any of the material facts going to degree is sufficient to determine 
the degree of the offense; this disjunctive relationship means that we can 
use the previously discussed operations of union and subtraction to 
model how each of the material facts going to degree relate to 
classification of a particular case within a particular degree of offense: 
N = E ⋃ F ⋃ G 
M = A ⋃ B ⋃ C ⋃ D 
P = U – (N ⋃ M) 
And because each of these three sets is composed of the union of other 
sets, we can understand each of the sets defined by the existence of a 
material fact going to degree to be a subset of a set defining the degree of 
crime committed by the defendant, which in turn is a subset of the set of 
the universe of all theft offenses. 
 Graphically, we can represent this universe of theft offenses as 
follows: 
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Figure 9 
 
One feature of our graphical representation bears mention, and 
perhaps qualification. Figure 9 assumes that there is no intersection 
between the sets defining material facts going to degree, and therefore 
no intersection between the sets defining degrees of theft offenses. For 
example, this graphic model assumes that there is no case that falls 
within both set F (theft of a firearm) and set A (theft of property with 
value between $50 and $500). This assumption is not necessarily 
correct—indeed, it almost certainly is not. We could revise our model of 
this universe of discourse to account for the possibility that these two 
sets would intersect—that firearms worth less than $500, or even less 
than $50, could be stolen. But then we would require some basis for 
determining which degree the offense of stealing such a firearm would 
fall into—whether, for example, the theft of a firearm worth $450 is a 
third-degree felony, or a misdemeanor, or both, or neither. Thus, the 
fact that our parent sets distinguishing one legal category from 
another—in this case, degrees of theft offenses—are composed of 
subsets that may intersect—in this case, sets defined by the existence of 
material facts going to degree—presents the potential for logical 
inconsistency in our model. 
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The Model Penal Code expressly contemplates the possibility that a 
single set of facts (or state of the world) might give rise to multiple 
offenses, or multiple degrees of an offense, simultaneously. It further 
seems to provide that a prosecutor has discretion to charge all crimes 
supported by the facts, even if this results in charging multiple degrees 
of the same offense, while the jury may only convict a defendant of one 
grade of offense “included” within the charged offense70—a construction 
that will be recognized as having affinities with the set-theoretic notion 
of inclusion. Thus, in the case of lesser included offenses, the Model 
Penal Code provides explicit strategies for navigating the logical 
inconsistency that might result from the intersection of sets defining 
different grades of property crime, and treats these strategies as legal 
rules in their own right. 
The important point for the present is not that the Model Penal 
Code solution is the correct strategy for dealing with the potential for 
logical inconsistency in a set-theoretic model of an area of legal 
doctrine, but that some such strategy is required. When two sets that 
correspond to categories defined by legal rules intersect, and those rules 
dictate mutually incompatible outcomes of a particular case, some 
additional content is required in order to avoid logical inconsistency. 
Again, we will more fully explore the possible strategies for avoiding 
such inconsistency in the following Part. Before doing so, we continue 
to fill out our basic model of legal reasoning and analysis by looking to 
the last of our set-theoretic operations: intersection. 
3.     Intersection: Legal Elements and Multi-Pronged Rules 
Intersection is the set-theoretic function most intimately tied to 
another important type of legal structure: the concept of “elements” of a 
claim, defense, or legal test. Consider the elements of the tort claim 
analogous to the crime of theft discussed above: conversion. One of the 
pithier recitations of the elements of this claim states them as follows: 
“(1) the plaintiff has a property interest and (2) the defendant deprives 
the plaintiff of that interest.”71 While more complex formulations of the 
 
 70 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07 (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
 71 Lassen v. First Bank Eden Prairie, 514 N.W.2d 831, 838 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). 
Sheff.40.5.9 (Do Not Delete) 7/15/2019  4:26 PM 
2062 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:2029 
conversion tort abound,72 this one will do to illustrate the role of 
intersection in our model. 
When we are dealing with legal tests framed in terms of “elements,” 
we are typically invoking notions of both logical sufficiency and logical 
necessity. When we say that certain elements are necessary to a legal 
claim, we mean that the absence of any of those elements would be fatal 
to that claim. When we say that certain elements are sufficient to 
establish a legal claim, we mean that if each and every one of those 
elements is proven, then the absence of any additional fact will not cause 
the claim to fail. Thus, when we say that our two criteria are elements of 
a cause of action for conversion, what we mean is that it is necessary for 
both of them to be present in a particular state of the world subject to a 
legal dispute in order for us to conclude that the defendant has 
committed that tort,73 and that the presence of both of these elements is 
a sufficient basis to conclude that the defendant committed that tort.74 In 
 
 72 See, e.g., G.S. Rasmussen & Associates, Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 906 
(9th Cir. 1992) (“In California, conversion has three elements: ownership or right to possession 
of property, wrongful disposition of the property right and damages.”); Cirrincione v. Johnson, 
703 N.E.2d 67, 70 (Ill. 1998) (“To prove conversion, a plaintiff must establish that (1) he has a 
right to the property; (2) he has an absolute and unconditional right to the immediate 
possession of the property; (3) he made a demand for possession; and (4) the defendant 
wrongfully and without authorization assumed control, dominion, or ownership over the 
property.”); Vigilant Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hous. Auth. of City of El Paso, 660 N.E.2d 1121, 1126 
(N.Y. 1995) (“Conversion is the unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of 
ownership over goods belonging to another to the exclusion of the owner’s rights.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 73 Thus, in jurisdictions where conversion of intangible property is actionable and where 
damage is an element of the cause of action, a plaintiff who shows ownership of the intangible 
property and the defendant’s taking of a copy of that property nevertheless cannot establish a 
conversion claim if the defendant destroys his copy of the plaintiff’s property prior to making 
any use of it. See, e.g., News Am. Mktg. In-Store, Inc. v. Marquis, 862 A.2d 837, 848 (Conn. 
App. Ct. 2004), aff’d, 885 A.2d 758 (Conn. 2005). 
 74 Thus, the fact that a conversion defendant lacked any bad-faith intent—or mens rea—is 
generally no barrier to a conversion claim. Deming v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 905 A.2d 623, 
639–40 (Conn. 2006) (“[S]tatutory theft requires an intent to deprive another of his 
property . . . [t]herefore, statutory theft requires a plaintiff to prove the additional element of 
intent over and above what he or she must demonstrate to prove conversion.”); Ahles v. Aztec 
Enters., Inc., 502 N.Y.S.2d 821, 822 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (“Intent to possess another’s 
property is not an essential element of conversion.”); DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN 
M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 62 (2d ed. 2018 update) (“The intent required to show 
conversion is exactly analogous to the intent required to prove a trespass to land. In neither 
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other words, the tort is established by a conjunction of these elements, 
and as discussed above, the logical relation of conjunction is expressed 
in set theory through the concept of intersection.75 
Once again, we can develop this concept both formally and 
graphically. Consider a universe of discourse consisting of states of the 
world in which someone has a legally cognizable property interest in a 
particular object of interest. Let us further define two sets within this 
universe of discourse by reference to the parties to a legal dispute. Let P 
be the set of all cases in which the plaintiff has a property interest in the 
object of interest, and let Q be the set of all cases in which the defendant 
has prevented others from exercising control over the object of interest. 
We can understand viable conversion claims as those that fall within the 
intersection of these two sets: 
C = P ∩ Q 
Graphically, we can represent this simplified model of conversion 
as follows: 
 
 
case is the defendant’s bad motive or good faith ordinarily relevant except on the question of 
punitive damages.”). 
 75 There are computational theories of legal reasoning that take a similar approach to more 
complex modeling problems by conceiving of cases as collections of “factors”—facts relevant to 
a rule directing a disposition. See generally KEVIN D. ASHLEY, MODELING LEGAL ARGUMENTS: 
REASONING WITH CASES AND HYPOTHETICALS (1991); John F. Horty, Rules and Reasons in the 
Theory of Precedent, 17 LEGAL THEORY 1 (2011). 
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Figure 10 
 
Thus, property interests that the plaintiff has in an object of 
interest, but which the defendant has not prevented the plaintiff from 
exercising control over, do not give rise to a conversion claim: The fact 
that you stole my car doesn’t mean I can sue you for conversion of the 
bicycle I still have. Likewise, objects that the defendant prevents others 
from enjoying will not ground a conversion claim by plaintiffs who have 
no property interest in those objects: You can’t sue me for conversion 
for driving my own car, or even your neighbor’s car, no matter how 
much you might disapprove of my conduct, or wish the car were yours. 
Again, we can present various factual scenarios graphically as part of 
our set-theoretic model of the relevant doctrine: 
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Figure 11 
 
As should be apparent, the predicates of these two sets are not 
especially informative. What it means for a plaintiff to have a property 
interest in a thing, and what it means for a defendant to prevent 
someone from exercising control over a thing, are not questions that our 
model can necessarily answer. And while this problem is not equally 
vexing for all predicates that might serve as intensional definitions of 
sets of legal interest—for example, “x is a natural person more than 18 
years of age”—it is quite a common concern in legal analysis. To solve 
such a problem, the common law often turns from intensional to 
extensional definition—a mode of reasoning that will complete our basic 
model of set theory in legal analysis. 
C.     Common-Law Rule-Building: Extensional Definition 
So far, our set-theoretic model of legal analysis has relied on 
intensionally defined sets. A legal authority (a statute or binding 
precedent) announces a rule that purports to define a category; 
subsequent cases are then evaluated for membership in that category. 
But in common-law systems, cases are not decided purely by deductive 
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reasoning from abstract rules of law encapsulated in legal authorities. 
They are also decided inductively, based on extrapolation of rules from 
the facts and outcomes of analogous precedents. In terms of legal 
theory, this is the interpretivist exercise of “discover[ing] principles that 
fit, not only the particular precedent to which some litigant directs his 
attention, but all other judicial decisions within [the court’s] general 
jurisdiction.”76 In our set-theoretic model, we can understand it as an 
exercise in extensional set definition.77 Importantly, this exercise 
interacts with the previously discussed exercise of determining whether 
a particular state of the world falls within an intensional definition. 
Moreover, this interaction between intensional and extensional set 
definition is recursive: intensionally defined rules guide the 
determination of cases, and the determination of cases goes on to 
inform the construction (and reformation) of intensional definitions.  
This recursive dynamic is nicely illustrated in the Ninth Circuit 
opinion in Kremen v. Cohen.78 Fortuitously, this case about conversion 
of a domain name also concerns an issue left open in the previous 
Section: how we might give content to a vague or ambiguous intensional 
definition such as “a property right of the plaintiff” in a marginal case. 
In Kremen, the dispute turned in part on a discrete legal issue: whether 
an internet domain name is “property” for purposes of the California 
law of conversion. To answer this question, Judge Kozinski,79 writing for 
the panel, considered two available intensional predicates for the 
relevant definition of “property” as applied to intangibles. One earlier 
Ninth Circuit case defined “property” as including “every intangible 
benefit and prerogative susceptible of possession or disposition.”80 In 
contrast, the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that intangible rights 
 
 76 Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1094 (1975) (emphasis added). 
 77 Schauer’s discussion of the common law, for example, includes a discussion of the 
extensional definition of rules based on the decisions of cases. SCHAUER, supra note 9, at 183–
85. 
 78 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 79 In 2009, Judge Kozinski was admonished by a judicial disciplinary panel for maintaining 
a publicly accessible server that included sexually explicit material. In 2017, he abruptly 
resigned after being accused of sexual misconduct by numerous women, including former law 
clerks. 
 80 Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030 (quoting Downing v. Mun. Court, 198 P.2d 923, 926 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1948)). 
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could be property subject to conversion “[w]here there is conversion of 
a document in which intangible rights are merged” or where the 
defendant “effectively prevents the exercise of intangible rights of the 
kind customarily merged in a document,” and further explains that 
“[a]n intangible is merged in a document when . . . the right to the 
immediate possession of a chattel . . . is represented by [the] document, 
or when an intangible obligation [is] represented by [the] document, 
which is regarded as equivalent to the obligation.”81 The choice of either 
of these definitions could be outcome determinative. After all, control 
over a domain name—which is no more or less than the system of 
distributed computer data records and architectural conventions that 
allows a particular string of text to uniquely identify a computer on the 
internet82—might be an “intangible benefit susceptible 
of . . . disposition,” but nevertheless might not be “merged in a 
document.” 
We can model this choice using the set-theoretic tools developed 
above. We can first illustrate the relevant universe of discourse as 
divided into our two complementary sets, π and ∆, corresponding to a 
judgment for the plaintiff and a judgment for the defendant, 
respectively. Given the Kremen court’s determination that a conversion 
claim under California law requires the plaintiff to show “ownership or 
right to possession of property, wrongful disposition of the property 
right and damages,”83 we can define the set corresponding to a 
judgment for the plaintiff as the intersection of three sets corresponding 
to these three elements. Taken together, we have the following formal 
definitions: 
  
 
 81 Id. at 1031 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 242 & cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965)). 
 82 See id. at 1033–35; see also INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE, RFC-1035: DOMAIN 
NAMES – IMPLEMENTATION AND SPECIFICATION (Nov. 1987), https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1035 
[https://perma.cc/KLH8-T393]. 
 83 Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1029 (quoting G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., 
Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 906 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
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f(x) = x is a property right owned by the plaintiff 
P = {x: f(x)} 
Q = {x: x is a property right wrongfully disposed of by the defendant}84 
R = {x: x is an act of the defendant that causes damage to the plaintiff} 
π = P ∩ (Q ∩ R) 
∆ = (U – π) = π' 
We can also represent this universe of discourse graphically as follows: 
 
Figure 12 
 
The main dispute in Kremen was over the size (or scope) of P. As 
the discussion above indicates, at least two alternative understandings of 
the predicate for P were available. We can amend our model to account 
for these alternative predicates: 
 
 84 Obviously, we could also define Q as the intersection of two other sets: property rights 
disposed of by the defendant and property rights the defendant has no right to dispose of. But 
doing so adds no clarity to the analysis in this case. It might be an important distinction, 
however, in cases where the defendant asserts such a right (for example, if the defendant asserts 
permission, ownership, necessity, or some other form of justification or excuse for the 
disposition). 
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g(x) = x is “any intangible benefit and prerogative susceptible of 
possession or disposition” owned by the plaintiff 
P1 = {x: g(x)} 
h(x) = x is a right to tangible property owned by the plaintiff 
i(x) = x is an intangible right owned by the plaintiff which is 
“represented by a document”85 
P2 = {x: (h(x) ∨ i(x))} 
π1 = (P1 ∩ Q) ∩ R 
∆1 = (U – π1) = π1' 
π2 = (P2 ∩ Q) ∩ R 
∆2 = (U – π2) = π2' 
Judge Kozinski seemed to be operating under the premise that the 
facts of Kremen would satisfy the Ninth Circuit’s definition of property, 
but not the Restatement’s definition.86 This is a consequential—and 
perhaps contestable—premise, which we will not examine here, saving 
such evaluation of membership relations for further investigation in 
Part III. For now, Judge Kozinski’s premise is mainly relevant in that it 
provides some additional propositions for our model: 
k = Kremen v. Cohen 
k ∈ P1 
k ∉ P2 
Given these revised and additional definitions, we can revise our 
graphic representation of the doctrine of conversion at issue in the case: 
 
 
 85 This predicate is the most appropriate for the analysis that immediately follows, but we 
could obviously draw further distinctions concerning the alleged wrongful act of the defendant, 
such as whether the defendant interfered with the document representing the intangible right 
or merely with the right itself.  
 86 Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030–31. 
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Figure 13 
 
If—as our model suggests—the outcome of Kremen depended on 
whether P1 or P2 is the appropriate category of “property” for purposes 
of establishing a California conversion claim, Judge Kozinski’s task was 
to decide which category was required by California law. To do so, he 
engaged in the classic common-law exercise of reviewing analogous 
precedent. Three cases decided by California courts particularly drove 
the analysis. Payne v. Elliot,87 the only California Supreme Court case on 
the issue, stated that the action for trover (the common-law predecessor 
of conversion) was “a remedy for the conversion of every species of 
personal property,” and therefore concluded that shares in a 
corporation could be converted even without conversion of the actual 
stock certificates themselves.88 Olschewski v. Hudson, in contrast, stated 
that “the proceeding in conversion was not intended to reach so 
intangible, uncertain, and indefinite a property right” as the interest the 
plaintiff in that case was claiming as property: a laundry route.89 In 
 
 87 54 Cal. 339 (1880). 
 88 Id. at 341. 
 89 Olschewski v. Hudson, 262 P. 43, 45–46 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1927). 
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doing so, Olschewski remarked that Payne’s categorical statement about 
the scope of conversion was “too broad” and “unnecessary to the 
determination of the issue in that case,” which could have been resolved 
on grounds that “[s]hares of stock are represented by certificates which 
are evidence of a definite interest in the assets of a company” and are 
therefore “tangible.”90 Olschewski thus relied on a rule quite similar to 
that of the Restatement. But a later case, Palm Springs-La Quinta 
Development Co. v. Kieberk Corp.,91 distinguished Olschewski to uphold 
a conversion claim against a defendant who wrongfully took possession 
of a large set of index cards recording customer information, and 
subsequently lost or destroyed a large number of those cards. The Palm 
Springs court’s justification for departing from Olschewski seemed to 
rest on the fact that the physical index cards themselves were tangible in 
a way that the goodwill and customer lists of a laundry service were 
not.92 
Based on these and other cases, Judge Kozinski drew distinctions 
between the intensional definitions provided by the language of the 
reviewed opinions, and the extensional definitions that could be inferred 
by grouping cases according to their outcomes. With respect to Payne, 
for example, he noted that “[w]hile Payne’s outcome might be 
reconcilable with the Restatement, its rationale certainly is not: It 
recognized conversion of shares, not because they are customarily 
represented by share certificates, but because they are a species of 
personal property and, perforce, protected.”93 Olschewski presented the 
 
 90 Id. at 46. Another laundry-route case relied on Olschewski to arrive at the same 
conclusion. Adkins v. Model Laundry Co., 268 P. 939, 942 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928) (“[T]here is no 
such property right in the intangible interest of an exclusive privilege to collect laundry or sell 
newspapers in a specific district, which will authorize damages in a suit at law for conversion or 
trover.”). 
 91 115 P.2d 548 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941). 
 92 Id. at 552 (“The defendant in [Olschewski] was not charged with converting an index list 
of customers. He was charged with selling the good-will of a business in a specified district. 
This court merely held that was an intangible property right which is not susceptible of 
conversion. In the present case the appellants were charged with damages for destroying and 
appropriating tangible personal property consisting of a cabinet of lead cards containing the 
names and valuable information regarding prospective and actual purchasers of real property, 
contrary to the express terms of a written contract. There is a clear distinction between these 
cases.”). 
 93 Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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opposite problem. The language of that opinion raised “a plausible 
argument that California follows the Restatement.”94 But this argument 
was undermined by comparison of the result in Olschewski with the 
result in Palm Springs. As Judge Kozinski put it: 
Palm Springs and Olschewski are reconcilable on their facts—the 
former involved conversion of the document itself while the latter 
did not. But this distinction can’t be squared with the Restatement. 
The plaintiff in Palm Springs recovered damages for the value of his 
intangibles. But if those intangibles were merged in the index 
cards . . . the plaintiffs in Olschewski . . . should have recovered [as 
well] . . . [L]aundry routes surely are customarily written down 
somewhere.95 
In attempting to reconcile these three cases, Judge Kozinski placed 
the greatest weight not on the rationales (or rules) announced in the 
judicial opinions he reviewed, but on the correlation of their underlying 
facts with their outcomes. Specifically, he tried to determine whether 
that correlation was captured by one of the available intensional 
definitions under consideration. If Olschewski held for the defendant on 
a rationale that was inconsistent with the outcome of Palm Springs, and 
if Payne held for the plaintiff on a rationale that was inconsistent with 
the outcome of Olschewski, both rationales should be disregarded in 
favor of a new rationale that can explain the outcomes in all three cases 
by reference to their underlying facts: 
To the extent Olschewski endorses the strict merger rule, it is against 
the weight of authority. . . . Were it necessary to settle the issue once 
and for all, we would toe the line of Payne and hold that conversion 
is “a remedy for the conversion of every species of personal 
property.” But we need not do so to resolve this case. Assuming 
arguendo that California retains some vestigial merger requirement, 
it is clearly minimal, and at most requires only some connection to a 
document or tangible object—not representation of the owner’s 
intangible interest in the strict Restatement sense.96 
 
 94 Id. at 1032. 
 95 Id.  
 96 Id. at 1033 (internal citation omitted). 
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Having thus (re)defined the relevant scope of a “property right,” Judge 
Kozinski went on to conclude that a domain name is sufficiently 
connected to a “document”—specifically, information stored in a 
collection of electronic records comprising the Domain Name System—
to satisfy his definition and thus make out a case for conversion.97 
We are now at last in a position to model the foregoing exercise in 
extensional set building both formally and graphically. We have three 
new cases to categorize, and must also formulate a new predicate for the 
set corresponding to the appropriate definition of “property.” Let us call 
that set P3. We thus have the following formal definitions: 
e = Payne v. Eliot 
o = Olschewski v. Hudson 
s = Palm Springs Development Co. v. Kieberk Corp. 
P3 = {x: (h(x) ∨ j(x))} 
e ∈ P3 
s ∈ P3 
k ∈ P3 
o ∉ P3 
Our task now is to formulate the as-yet-unspecified predicate j(x), 
which defines the type of intangible right that is “property” under 
California conversion law. Because we are proceeding by extensional 
definition, it may be most helpful to turn here to our graphical model, 
focusing in on the area of interest. If we map our cases according to the 
relationship between the intangible right at issue and some document 
(with placement closer to the center of P implying a closer relationship 
to a traditional document), we might arrive at something like this: 
 
 
 97 Id. at 1033–34. 
Sheff.40.5.9 (Do Not Delete) 7/15/2019  4:26 PM 
2074 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:2029 
Figure 14 
 
The task, then, is to identify a predicate j(x) that is satisfied by e, k, 
and s, but is not satisfied by o. Judge Kozinski’s solution to this problem 
can be formally expressed as follows:  
j(x) = x is an intangible right having some minimal connection to a 
document or tangible object 
This type of exercise—organizing cases according to their 
outcomes and identifying some common feature that is present in all 
cases with one outcome but absent from all cases with the opposing 
outcome—is the hallmark of common-law reasoning by analogy and 
distinction. It should be familiar to most lawyers, and is among the key 
skills to be mastered by law students. But conceiving of this classic 
exercise in set-theoretic terms highlights some important points.  
First: The relationship between rules and cases is both dynamic and 
recursive. Announced intensional rules inform the outcomes of 
individual cases, but extensional definitions based on the outcomes of 
those individual cases may then in turn qualify, modify, and potentially 
even overturn those intensional rules, and so on and so forth. This 
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recursive process generates constant, dynamic refinement and 
reformulation of the universe of discourse of legal doctrines.98 
Second: Judge Kozinski gives extensional definition precedence 
over intensional definition. Indeed, his effort to reconcile Payne with 
inferior California court opinions suggests that this precedence may be 
more important in his view than the transmission of intensional rules 
via the hierarchies of appellate authority. We can understand this 
preference for extensional definition as a reflection of Dworkin’s 
observation about the notion of “fit”: that a judge “does not satisfy his 
duty to show that his decision is consistent with established principles, 
and therefore fair, if the principles he cites as established are themselves 
inconsistent with other decisions that his court also proposes to 
uphold.”99 As in the context of lesser included offenses, a conflict 
between two applicable rules requires some strategy for resolution. The 
interpretivist concepts of fit and justification appear to constitute 
another such strategy: one that purports to resolve contradictions 
between intensional definitions from the text of judicial opinions and 
extensional definitions derived from the juxtaposition of multiple prior 
judicial decisions in favor of the latter. Again, the point is not that Judge 
Kozinski’s (or Dworkin’s) strategy is the right one, but that some such 
strategy is required.  
Third: The prioritization of one rule over another can be 
implemented in a number of formally distinct ways, with differing 
implications for the legal universe of discourse in which the conflict of 
rules arises. As Judge Kozinski recognized, he could simply have 
followed the intensional definition of “property” extracted from the 
Payne opinion, and evaluated Kremen’s claimed property interest 
against that definition. This would have entailed a conclusion that 
Olschewski was wrongly decided, and reordered the membership 
relations between the discussed cases and the intensionally-defined set 
containing them. Instead of doing so, Judge Kozinski altered the 
inclusion relationships between the sets defined by intensional 
predicates from earlier judicial opinions and the sets defining the 
outcomes of conversion cases, adding a new intensionally-defined set of 
 
 98 Cf. Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 572–73 (1987) (noting that 
precedent is both “forward-looking” and “backward-looking”). 
 99 Dworkin, supra note 76, at 1094. 
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his own to the universe of discourse. Rather than altering the 
membership relations between the precedents and rule-based sets, Judge 
Kozinski altered the inclusion relationships between rule-based sets and 
the outcomes of adjudication. These strategies are distinct, not in their 
result for the particular case (Kremen would have prevailed either way), 
but as a matter of logical form. Even so, as precedents in their own right, 
opinions implementing such strategies make different claims on the 
future legal universe of discourse. 
This type of formal difference in the behavior of legal actors 
becomes more complex when we consider that not all legal authorities 
lend themselves to this type of extensional set-building. In particular, 
regulations, statutes, and constitutions cannot be analyzed 
extensionally, because they consist solely of intensional definitions. 
They have no facts, no outcomes, to feed into the recursive process of 
extensional construction. Still, when a conflict arises among such 
intensional definitions—whether derived from non-caselaw authorities 
or from the language of judicial opinions—there may be other ways of 
avoiding a logically inconsistent set-theoretic model of the universe of 
discourse subject to those authorities. Mapping out those strategies—
and their implications—is the project of the rest of this Article. 
III.     FORMAL STRATEGIES FOR AVOIDING CONTRADICTION 
The set-theoretic tools developed in the previous Part may be 
helpful in formalizing ordinary legal reasoning, but if that were all they 
achieved they would mainly be of interest to only a small set of theorists, 
educators, and (perhaps) law students. After all, most lawyers and 
judges get by perfectly well in their professional lives without conceiving 
of their arguments and analyses in terms of predicate logic or Venn 
diagrams. In this Part, however, I will argue that the tools developed in 
the previous Part are necessary to adequately understand an important 
feature of legal practice that is intimately connected to the process of 
common-law doctrinal development and change.  
Specifically, I propose that legal actors are free to respond in 
particular cases to the constraints imposed by conflicting applicable 
legal authorities by resorting to at least three formally distinct types of 
arguments: (1) arguments about the relation of those authorities to the 
facts of particular cases; (2) arguments about the relation of those 
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authorities to one another; or (3) arguments about the relation of those 
authorities to adjudicative outcomes. The distinctions among these 
types of arguments map to discrete aspects of the set-theoretic model 
developed in the previous part, but not necessarily to discrete features of 
the natural language in which legal authorities are expressed or to the 
substance of the rules embodied in those authorities. Thus, 
understanding the set-theoretic model of legal reasoning allows for 
deeper appreciation of the choices made by legal actors in advocacy and 
adjudication, and raises theoretical issues separate from typical 
jurisprudential concerns founded on the ambiguity (or “open 
texture”100) of language. This Part focuses on the first of these issues—
understanding how strategies for resolving doctrinal conflicts differ, and 
how those differences relate to changes in doctrine over time. The next 
Part will address the second issue: how a formal understanding of the 
diverse strategies for negotiating doctrinal conflict relates to legal 
theoretical debates—particularly those focusing on the determinacy (or 
lack thereof) of law. 
A.     Competing Predicates and Logical Contradictions: Outlining the 
Problem 
Distinctions among the logical forms of strategies for resolving 
doctrinal conflicts are best illustrated with a simple model of 
contradiction and constraint: the apparent applicability of two legal 
rules requiring opposite outcomes to the facts of a single case. We first 
addressed this possibility explicitly when discussing lesser included 
criminal offenses;101 we will see shortly that our discussion of subleases 
and assignments presented a similar problem.102 When presented with 
such a conflict of authority, a legal actor may struggle to maintain the 
logical consistency of a body of doctrine. The resolution of that conflict 
requires legal actors to manipulate the logical structure of the legal 
universe of discourse, and there are multiple ways of doing so. In short, 
 
 100 HART, supra note 8, at 127–28; see generally Frederick Schauer, On the Open Texture of 
Law, 87 GRAZER PHILOSOPHISCHE STUDIEN 197 (2013). 
 101 Supra Section II.B.2. 
 102 Supra Section II.B.1. 
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legal actors have significant discretion in the formal strategies they use 
in arguing or adjudicating cases. 
To see how the conflict of legal authorities generates multiple 
possible formally distinct resolution strategies, let us consider some 
examples from intellectual property law. Intellectual property lawyers 
and scholars often group legal rules in the field into four distinct groups: 
validity, infringement, defenses, and remedies.103 Questions of validity—
whether someone has a protectable intellectual property right or not—
particularly lend themselves to set-theoretical analysis. 
Let us suppose that when asking whether an individual has a valid 
intellectual property right or not (which we may for present purposes 
consider a binary proposition104), we are asking whether the intangible 
asset they claim satisfies certain predicates for set membership. 
Specifically (following the analysis of the previous Part), we are asking 
whether the intangible asset is a member of a set defined as the 
intersection of other sets, which are in turn defined by the applicable 
legal rules concerning validity. For copyrights, we ask whether the 
claimed right is protectable subject matter (i.e., a work of authorship),105 
whether it is original,106 and whether it is fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression107—an intersection of three sets. For trademarks, we ask 
 
 103 Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2197, 2200 & n.1 
(2016) (“Intellectual property (IP) law doctrines fall into three basic categories: validity, 
infringement, and defenses. Virtually every significant legal doctrine in IP is either about 
whether the plaintiff has a valid IP right that the law will recognize (validity); whether what the 
defendant did violates that right (infringement); or whether the defendant is somehow 
privileged to violate that right (defenses). . . . If the IP owner prevails, there are also issues about 
the remedy awarded.”). 
 104 Lemley and McKenna argue that many intellectual property law cases turn not on the 
validity of an intellectual property right but on its scope—a non-binary proposition. See 
generally id. While this is true, it is always possible to reformulate the non-binary question of a 
right’s scope as a binary question: i.e., “does the plaintiff have a right of this scope or not”? See 
supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. Importantly, this is a formal move, not a substantive 
one—it reframes the question in such a way as to allow clearer modeling of the applicable 
analysis according to the tools used in this Article, but still requires some substantive content as 
to the appropriate scope of intellectual property rights, and moreover requires some external 
reason for selecting a right of the posited scope as the appropriate subject for analysis. 
 105 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1990). 
 106 Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–47 (1991). 
 107 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010); Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 129 (2d 
Cir. 2008) (“[T]o determine whether a work is ‘fixed’ in a given medium, the statutory language 
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whether the claimed mark is protectable subject matter,108 whether it is 
distinctive,109 and whether the claimant has used it in commerce110—
another intersection of three sets. For patents, we ask whether the 
claimed invention is patentable subject matter, novel, useful, non-
obvious, and has been adequately described in an enabling disclosure—
an intersection of five sets.111 To reiterate: This last example envisions 
that inventions that can be categorized as to their membership in the set 
defined as the intersection of five other sets, themselves defined by the 
substantive legal criteria of patentability. Inventions within that area of 
intersection are entitled to patent protection—we may say they are 
elements of the set of patentable inventions—while those that are 
outside that set are unpatentable (or invalid if a patent has erroneously 
issued for them). 
Moreover, each of the five criteria for patentability (whose 
intersection determines a patent’s validity) may be further defined via 
set-theoretic operations. Consider patentable subject matter. Section 
101 of the Patent Act defines patentable subject matter as any “process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”112 We can express 
this rule formally using the tools developed in the previous Part. First, 
we must establish some definitions: 
  
 
directs us to ask not only 1) whether a work is ‘embodied’ in that medium, but also 2) whether 
it is embodied in the medium ‘for a period of more than transitory duration.’”). 
 108 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (“[T]he Lanham 
Act . . . says that trademarks ‘includ[e] any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof.’ [15 U.S.C.] § 1127. Since human beings might use as a ‘symbol’ or ‘device’ almost 
anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning, this language, read literally, is not 
restrictive.”). 
 109 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (holding that to be 
protected, a trademark must be “capable of distinguishing the applicant’s goods from those of 
others”). 
 110 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (“The term “trademark” includes any word, name, symbol, or 
device, or any combination thereof . . . used by a person . . . to identify and distinguish his or 
her goods.” (emphasis added)); Hydro-Dynamics, Inc. v. George Putnam & Co., 811 F.2d 1470, 
1473 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“The requirements of both adoption and use devolve from the common 
law; trademark rights in the United States are acquired by such adoption and use, not by 
registration.”). 
 111 35 U.S.C.A §§ 101–103; 112 (West 2015). 
 112 35 U.S.C.A § 101 (West 2015). To simplify this illustrative example we will omit the 
patentability of improvements to existing inventions. 
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P(x) = x is a process 
Q(x) = x is a machine 
R(x) = x is a manufacture 
S(x) = x is a composition of matter 
A = {x : P(x)} 
B = {x : Q(x)} 
C = {x : R(x)} 
D = {x : S(x)} 
Now let us imagine a set E representing the set of all inventions 
that qualify as patentable subject matter. Given our prior definitions and 
the text of Section 101 we can construct E as a union of several other 
sets: 
E = A ⋃ B ⋃ C ⋃ D 
The statutory definition of patentable subject matter is 
inclusionary, i.e., it tells us what is patentable subject matter. One might 
therefore think that everything outside this definition is not patentable 
subject matter; i.e., that the complement E' would be a complete and 
adequate formal description of subject matter that is unpatentable under 
Section 101. But it isn’t. And this is because the universe of discourse 
regarding patentable subject matter includes more legal sets than those 
encompassed by the statutory definition of Section 101. 
As Justice Breyer noted in Mayo Collaborative Services v. 
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,113 “The [Supreme] Court has long held 
that [Section 101] contains an important implicit exception. ‘[L]aws of 
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas’ are not patentable.”114 
This is, obviously, an exclusionary definition: It tells us what is not 
patentable subject matter. And we might ask whether this definition is 
equivalent to our previously derived description of unpatentable subject 
matter, E'. 
All scholars and practitioners of patent law know that these two 
definitions are not equivalent, and even those unschooled in this area of 
doctrine will immediately understand why. The non-equivalence is 
signaled by Justice Breyer’s use of the word “exception” in Mayo. But 
 
 113 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
 114 Id. at 70. 
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formalizing what this exception means with respect to Section 101—
how the inclusionary and exclusionary definitions interact as a matter of 
logical form—will help us understand the value of set-theoretic analysis 
for managing conflicting intensional predicates. Let us construct a 
formal definition of unpatentable subject matter under the Supreme 
Court’s exclusionary definition and attempt to integrate it with our 
formalization of the inclusionary definition of Section 101: 
T(x) = x is a law of nature 
V(x) = x is a natural phenomenon 
W(x) = x is an abstract idea 
F = {x : T(x)} 
G = {x : V(x)} 
H = {x : W(x)} 
Now let us suppose some set K that will represent the set of all 
unpatentable subject matter under the Supreme Court’s definition as 
stated in Mayo: 
K = F ⋃ G ⋃ H 
The question we are trying to answer is whether either of the 
following logically equivalent assertions are true: 
E = K' 
K = E' 
That is, we want to know whether the inclusionary definition of 
Section 101 and the exclusionary definition from Supreme Court 
caselaw are complements in the set-theoretic sense of the word. 
And now the problem is clear: These two definitions are not 
complements. Moreover, the reason why they are not complements is 
important—it is because some of the subsets of E have non-empty 
intersections with some of the subsets of K. We can see such intersection 
in two lines of cases. The first involves cases such as Parke-Davis & Co. 
v. H.K. Mulford Co.115 and Association of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc.,116 in which certain isolated and purified biological 
products are—at least arguably—elements both of set D (compositions 
 
 115 189 F. 95 (2d Cir. 1911) (Learned Hand, J.). 
 116 569 U.S. 576 (2013). 
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of matter) and set G (natural phenomena). The second involves cases 
such as Bilski v. Kappos117 and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l,118 in which 
certain computerized methods useful in the finance industry are—at 
least arguably—elements both of set A (processes) and set H (abstract 
ideas). These examples of objects that are elements of subsets of both E 
and K render the complementarity of E and K logically impossible: 
complements are necessarily disjoint sets.119   
To illustrate the same point graphically, imagine some object n that 
is an element of both sets A and H—i.e., it is both a process and an 
abstract idea. We can represent the resulting universe of discourse as 
follows: 
 
 
 117 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 118 573 U.S. 208 (2014). 
 119 We can establish this by assuming that E and K are complements and then proving a 
contradiction based on the existence of an object that is an element of subsets of both E and K. 
Formally we may express our proof as follows, given a universe of discourse including the sets 
as defined in the text and some object n that is both a process and an abstract idea: 
(1) Let E = K'  (Assumption) 
(2) E = U – K   (Definition of Complementarity; 1) 
(3) E = {x : (x ∈ U) ∧ (x ∉ K)} (Definition of Set Subtraction) 
(4) ¬∃(x)[(x ∈ E) ∧ (x ∈ K)] (Definition of Set Membership; 3) 
(5) (n ∈ A) ∧ ( n ∈ H) (Given) 
(6) A ⊆ E  (Given) 
(7) H ⊆ K  (Given) 
(8) (n ∈ E) ∧( n ∈ K) (Definition of Inclusion; 5, 6, 7) 
(9) ⊥  (6, 8) 
(10) ¬ ( E = K')  (1, 9) 
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Figure 15 
 
By the definition of the relation of inclusion, n will be a member of both 
E (which includes its subset A) and K (which includes its subset H). But 
if this is true, E and K cannot be complements, because complements 
can have no elements in common. 
Thus, treating the inclusionary statutory definition and the 
exclusionary common-law definition of patentable subject matter as 
mutually consistent—i.e., as set-theoretic complements—is logically 
untenable. If processes are patentable, but abstract ideas are not 
patentable, any object that is both a process and an abstract idea yields 
the above-described logical contradiction—it must be both patentable 
and not patentable at the same time. Indeed, we can generalize this 
understanding. Expressed as a matter of set theory, we may say that any 
time two definitions for a legal set exist—one inclusionary and one 
exclusionary—if the definitions do not define disjoint sets they will 
generate logical contradictions. The question then arises how to avoid 
such contradictions. We will consider three strategies for doing so: (1) 
the Trump Card, (2) the No True Scotsman, and (3) the Tertium Quid. 
B.     The Trump Card 
As suggested earlier, the patent lawyer has a ready answer to the 
accusation of logical inconsistency in patentable subject matter doctrine. 
This answer is implied in the recitation of the exclusionary definition 
from Mayo quoted above: that the rule of Section 101 “contains an 
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important implicit exception.”120 That is, the Supreme Court may be 
understood as saying that its definition is an exception to the otherwise 
applicable statutory definition of patentable subject matter: that it carves 
out some territory that would otherwise be covered by Section 101. Put 
another way, the Court can be understood to be saying that its 
definition takes precedence over the text of Section 101—that in the 
event of a conflict between the two, the Court’s exclusionary definition 
applies and Congress’s inclusionary definition does not. 
This move is the first of our strategies for resolving a logical 
contradiction presented by competing intensional definitions of 
applicable doctrinal categories. Let us call it the Trump Card. The 
Trump Card move embraces the intersection between two subsets at 
issue, and concludes that one takes precedence over—or “trumps”—the 
other. For such a move to work, we must revise our model of the 
universe of discourse defined by the applicable legal rules. For example, 
we must now recognize that a process is only patentable subject matter 
if it is also not an abstract idea. 
We have seen this move before. A similar logical structure 
undergirded our model of the law of sublease and assignment. There, we 
had to account for the possibility that a sublessee might assume the 
covenants of the primary lease, and thereby become directly liable to the 
primary landlord.121 Recall that in that instance, an assumption of 
covenants by a sublessee provided an exception to the rule that 
sublessees cannot be held directly liable. The fact that we encountered 
the same formal structure of doctrine in a body of law that we modeled 
via the set-theoretic operation of subtraction suggests that subtraction 
could be a useful tool not only for modeling settled doctrine, but for 
resolving contradictions among competing relevant legal authorities if 
and when they are first presented. 
But set subtraction is not our only option for modeling the Trump 
Card. Formally we could express the move in another way. Let us return 
to the patentable subject matter example. One possible way of applying 
the Trump Card to this example would be to refine our predicates for 
patentable (and unpatentable) subject matter using the logical operation 
of conjunction with a negated premise. Thus: 
 
 120 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012). 
 121 Supra Section II.B.1. 
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A = {x: P(x) ∧ ¬W(x)} 
H = {x: W(x)} 
This approach does capture the logic of the Trump Card, in that a 
subject matter that satisfies predicate P (i.e., is a process) will still be 
categorized as unpatentable if it also satisfies predicate W (i.e., is an 
abstract idea). However, revising our predicates in this way may be an 
insufficient basis for a comprehensive model of this particular body of 
doctrine if our intensional definitions—inclusionary and exclusionary—
are not exhaustive of the universe of discourse. That is, we might still 
wonder whether a subject matter that is neither within the statute’s 
inclusionary definitions nor within the judicially developed exclusionary 
definitions is patentable or not. 
The doctrinal answer appears to be that it is not—that even if a 
patent claim does not fall within one of the judicial exceptions, so long 
as it is not within one of the statute’s inclusionary categories it will still 
be unpatentable. Examples of such subject matter include a company, an 
arrangement of printed matter, or a collection of data.122 Accounting for 
this possibility in our model of the doctrine, we must imagine the 
relevant universe of discourse as being divided into patentable subject 
matter—which includes things that are within the inclusionary statutory 
definitions but not within the judicial exclusionary definitions—and 
unpatentable subject matter—which includes everything else, including 
but not limited to things that are within the judicial exclusionary 
definitions.123 In other words, it requires us to frame our two binary 
outcomes—patentable versus unpatentable subject matter—in terms of 
the set theoretic concept of complementation. Patentable subject matter 
is defined intensionally (with a combination of inclusionary and 
exclusionary definitions); unpatentable subject matter is simply 
 
 122 For a list of “[n]on-limiting examples” of such subject matter, see 2016 Patent Subject 
Matter Eligibility [R-08.2017], U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/pac/mpep/s2106.html [https://perma.cc/92WZ-MQ7G] (last visited Mar. 26, 2019) 
(§ 2106.04(c)) (collecting cases). 
 123 Despite this substantive default in favor of unpatentability, as a procedural matter Federal 
Circuit doctrine stages patent examination in such a way that “the examiner bears the initial 
burden . . . of presenting a prima facie case of unpatentability.” In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 
1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (emphasis omitted). At least one commentator blames this procedural 
device for issuance of patents that do not meet the standards of patentability. See Sean B. 
Seymore, Patent Asymmetries, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 963, 976–91 (2016).  
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everything in the universe of discourse that is not patentable subject 
matter.124 
Because we must resort to complementation if we are to exhaust 
the universe of discourse, revising the intensional predicates of the sets 
corresponding to our legal categories is insufficient to comprehensively 
resolve the potential for contradiction identified earlier. Instead, we 
must revise the inclusion relations between the set of patentable subject 
matter and its subsets. As with the law of sublease and assignment—and 
as foreshadowed above—we achieve this through the operation of 
subtraction. Formally, with respect to the relationship between the set of 
“processes” and the set of “abstract ideas,” we achieve this as follows: 
H ⊆ K 
(A – H) ⊆ E 
Thus, the graphic model of these sets can now be represented as 
follows, eliminating the earlier contradiction: 
 
 
 124 Even if the default position were reversed—that is, even if the Supreme Court’s 
exclusionary rule exhausted the category of unpatentable subject matter, leaving everything else 
patentable—we would still need to rely on complementation and inclusion rather than 
predication to arrive at an exhaustive model of the universe of discourse. Of course, if an 
exhaustive model is not deemed necessary or desirable—if, for example, one is willing to 
tolerate “gaps” in the law—predication might well be a sufficient basis for modeling the 
interaction of mutually inconsistent rules such as those discussed in this Section. Indeed, it is 
the legal positivist’s insistence on some authoritative source for legal rules in ascertainable 
social facts that has the potential to generate such “gaps” in doctrinal models. See generally 
Joseph Raz, Legal Reasons, Sources, and Gaps, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND 
MORALITY 53 (2009). 
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Figure 16 
 
When we expand our focus to consider all the predicates 
underlying our model of the doctrine of patentable subject matter, we 
can use subtraction to revise our inclusion relations in a similar way to 
resolve all the contradictions among our rules via the Trump Card 
move. Expressing this series of moves formally, we have: 
(F ⋃ G ⋃ H) ⊆ K 
E = (A ⋃ B ⋃ C ⋃ D) – (F ⋃ G ⋃ H) 
K = E' 
This formalization of the Trump Card explains an important and 
useful strategy for resolving conflicts between contradictory legal rules. 
But as the discussion of this Part demonstrates, arriving at this 
formalization required us to think hard about not only the rules 
themselves, nor even their application to a particular set of facts, but 
how they relate to one another, to various individual cases, and to the 
full universe of discourse. Moreover, it required us to resolve an 
ambiguity in our logic: We had to determine whether the relationships 
among the different features of our model was best captured by a 
modification of the predicates of certain sets (that is, the membership 
relation between rules and cases), or by a modification of the 
relationships between those sets (that is, the inclusion relation between 
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rules and adjudicative outcomes). We will more thoroughly examine 
this ambiguity in Part IV. First, let us review some alternative strategies 
for avoiding the logical contradictions threatened by conflicting rules. 
C.     The No True Scotsman 
The No True Scotsman is an analytical move identified by 
philosopher Antony Flew, who illustrated it by means of an anecdote: 
Imagine some Scottish chauvinist settled down one Sunday morning 
with his customary copy of The News of the World. He reads the story 
under the headline, ‘Sidcup Sex Maniac Strikes Again’. Our reader is, 
as he confidently expected, agreeably shocked: ‘No Scot would do 
such a thing!’ Yet the very next Sunday he finds in that same 
favourite source a report of the even more scandalous on-goings of 
Mr Angus MacSporran in Aberdeen. This clearly constitutes a 
counter example, which definitively falsifies the universal 
proposition originally put forward. . . . Allowing that this is indeed 
such a counter example, he ought to withdraw; retreating perhaps to 
a rather weaker claim about most or some. But even an imaginary 
Scot is, like the rest of us, human; and we none of us always do what 
we ought to do. So in fact what he says is: ‘No true Scotsman would 
do such a thing!’125 
The No True Scotsman move allows us to maintain our predicates 
and the sets constructed by them unchanged, at the cost of implausibly 
denying their application to certain objects we rely on them to classify. 
As Flew puts it, “[a] bold, indeed reckless, claim about all those who 
happen to be members of a certain category is being surreptitiously 
replaced by an utterance which is, in effect, made true by an arbitrary 
redefinition.”126 
Many determinations in legal analysis have this kind of arbitrary 
feel. Wherever a doctrine is subject to a flexible standard, a multi-factor 
balancing test, or a totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry—as opposed to 
a bright-line rule—reasonable minds will frequently differ as to whether 
 
 125 ANTONY FLEW, THINKING ABOUT THINKING 47 (1975) (emphasis added). Sidcup is a 
suburban neighborhood of southeastern London. 
 126 Id. at 47–48. 
Sheff.40.5.9 (Do Not Delete) 7/15/2019  4:26 PM 
2019] LEGAL SETS 2089 
marginal cases fall within or without the category defined by the 
applicable legal doctrine. Intellectual property law, for example, has no 
shortage of such fuzzy doctrines: the “likelihood of confusion” multi-
factor tests for trademark infringement;127 the “substantial similarity” 
standard for copyright infringement;128 the “fair, reasonable, and 
nondiscriminatory” standard for patent licensing terms;129 the “non-
obviousness” standard for patent validity.130 Such standards are perhaps 
even more common in less specialized areas of law: disagreements 
abound as to what conduct is consistent with the duty of “reasonable 
care,”131 what constitutes a “compelling state interest,”132 or what is 
consistent with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.”133 
We will return to the theoretical issues underlying the rules-versus-
standards dichotomy and its relation to the set-theoretic model we are 
developing later.134 For now, we may confine ourselves to the 
observation that such standards are especially vexing when they 
threaten the type of doctrinal contradiction we have been examining in 
this Part. To illustrate the problem, let us consider the interaction of the 
 
 127 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 24:28–43 (4th ed. 1996); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 
1961); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 128 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03; Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946); 
Sid & Marty Krofft TV Prods. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 129 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1048 (9th Cir. 2015). In litigation 
contexts, this standard intersects with yet another complex and fuzzy standard: the 15-factor 
analysis for calculating patent damages under Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 
F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
 130 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). 
 131 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 127 (2d ed. 
2011) (“The duty owed by all people generally—the standard of care—is the duty to exercise the 
care that would be exercised by a reasonable and prudent person under the same or similar 
circumstances to avoid or minimize risks of harm to others.”). 
 132 See generally Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict 
Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355 (2006). 
 133 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see also Kulko v. Superior Court, 
436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (“Like any standard that requires a determination of ‘reasonableness,’ the 
‘minimum contacts’ test of International Shoe is not susceptible of mechanical 
application . . . We recognize that this determination is one in which few answers will be 
written in black and white. The greys are dominant and even among them the shades are 
innumerable.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 134 See infra Section IV.B. 
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copyright doctrines of fair use and the derivative works right. Section 
106 of the Copyright Act gives copyright owners the exclusive right “to 
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work,” and to 
authorize others to do so—unauthorized preparation of a derivative 
work is an infringement of copyright.135 However, this right is “subject 
to” the doctrine of copyright fair use—codified in Section 107 of the 
Act—which provides that a “fair use” of a copyrighted work “is not an 
infringement of copyright.”136 And “fair use” is a notoriously imprecise 
doctrinal category. A finding of fair use depends on a weighing of four 
statutory factors, each of which derives from—and has been further 
developed by—a long line of case law.137 Moreover, there appears to be 
significant overlap between the categories “derivative work” and “fair 
use.” 
Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines a “derivative work” as “a 
work based upon one or more pre-existing works, . . . [in any] form in 
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”138 But under 
current interpretations of Section 107, perhaps the single most 
important factor in determining whether a use is “fair” (and therefore 
non-infringing) is whether it is “transformative”: that is, whether it 
“adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, 
altering the first [work] with new expression, meaning, or message.”139 
Indeed, Jane Ginsburg recently concluded (or perhaps lamented) that 
under current doctrine, “if the [defendant’s] use is ‘transformative,’ the 
four-factor statutory test [for fair use under Section 107] effectively 
reduces to a single factor.”140 Thus, the “transformation” of a 
 
 135 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(2) (2002), 501(a) (2002). 
 136 17 U.S.C. §§ 106–07 (1976). 
 137 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976); 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 10 (2007). 
 138 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 139 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–79 (1994) (citing Pierre N. Leval, 
Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990)). 
 140 Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free, or Permitted-but-Paid?, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1383, 
1400 (2014); but see Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 
1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 595, 604–05 (2008) (“It appears . . . that courts and 
commentators have exaggerated the influence of transformativeness doctrine on our fair use 
case law. . . . Nevertheless, in those opinions in which transformativeness did play a role, it 
exerted nearly dispositive force not simply on the outcome of factor one but on the overall 
outcome of the fair use test. More specifically, the data suggest that while a finding of 
transformativeness is not necessary to trigger an overall finding of fair use, it is sufficient to do 
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copyrighted work without authorization may be both a necessary and a 
sufficient basis to categorize a particular use of a copyrighted work as 
both an infringing derivative work under Section 106 and a non-
infringing fair use under Section 107. This contradiction has attracted 
the attention of copyright scholars.141 
Note that this contradiction is structurally more difficult to resolve 
via the Trump Card than was the patentable subject matter 
contradiction. In the context of patentable subject matter, we had to 
determine how to categorize an invention that was—for example—both 
a “process” and an “abstract idea.” Here, we have to determine how to 
categorize a use that is both a “transformation” for purposes of the 
derivative works right and “transformative” for purposes of fair use 
doctrine. In the latter context, it is not clear from the natural language 
of the relevant predicates that the two doctrinal subsets of interest are in 
fact different sets. If they are not, then we would be unable to avoid the 
self-contradictory conclusion that a use of a copyrighted work that falls 
into this set is simultaneously a derivative-works-right infringement and 
a non-infringing fair use simply by subtracting one doctrinal set from 
the other. (Subtraction would yield only the null set, implying that the 
one doctrine completely abrogates the other.) 
So let us assume for the moment that “uses that transform a 
copyrighted work” and “uses that are transformative of a copyrighted 
work” are in fact nonequivalent sets, and that all transformative uses are 
fair while all uses that transform are infringing. We can begin to model 
these sets along the lines of the model developed earlier in the context of 
patentable-subject-matter doctrine (though for now the model will be 
much simpler): 
  
 
so.”). Professor Beebe’s regression analysis revealed that no factual finding had a stronger 
association with a finding of fair use than a finding of transformativeness, and that only one 
factual finding—that the defendant took the “heart” of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work—had a 
stronger association in favor of either party.  
 141 See generally, e.g., R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 
31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467 (2008). 
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E = {x: x is an infringement of copyright} 
K = {x: x is not an infringement of copyright} 
P(x) = x is a use that transforms a copyrighted work 
A = {x: P(x)} 
A ⊆ E 
W(x) = x is a transformative use of a copyrighted work 
H = {x: W(x)} 
H ⊆ K 
Again, it seems quite likely that sets A and H would have a large 
area of intersection, but to serve our purposes in modeling the strategies 
for resolving logical contradictions in doctrine we can represent our 
model of copyright doctrines graphically as formally identical to our 
model of patentable subject matter doctrine, to highlight the structural 
similarities (and differences) between the two strategies we are 
examining. We complete the model by positing some case n that is both 
“a transformative use” and “a use that transforms,” and represent our 
universe of discourse graphically (yielding a familiar picture): 
 
Figure 17 
 
The No True Scotsman is a strategy to resolve this contradiction by 
positing that n is not in fact a “transformative use,” even though it 
would seem to be under conventional understandings of the natural 
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language of the predicate. The copyright example illustrates the strategy. 
In much fair use litigation, the key question is whether the defendant’s 
use is sufficiently “transformative” to qualify as a fair use, even though it 
is undisputed that the defendant’s use has in some way changed the 
plaintiff’s work in making a new use of it. Diane Zimmerman described 
the underlying dilemma, and the moves by which courts resolve it: 
What is hard to understand is why the courts engaged in so much 
twisting and turning to avoid the seemingly obvious conclusion that, 
whatever else might have been troubling in the defendants’ cases, the 
uses in question were at least “transformative”: they clearly did 
provide the public with a new or substantially reworked 
product. . . . Judges who face a kind of transformative use that they 
strongly believe ought to be controlled by the plaintiff alone may well 
think that they are caught between the proverbial rock and a hard 
place. It is little wonder, therefore, that they sometimes resolve their 
dilemma by performing a little deft Lewis Carroll-type surgery on the 
inconvenient word to create an escape for themselves from that 
uncomfortable space.142 
We can identify this “twisting and turning” or “Lewis Carroll-type 
surgery” as an instance of the No True Scotsman in action. For example, 
in Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc.143—
cited by Professor Zimmerman144—the Second Circuit affirmed then–
District Judge Sotomayor’s award of summary judgment to the owners 
of the copyright in the popular television show Seinfeld against the 
publisher of an unauthorized book of trivia based on the show. The 
court cited Section 101’s definition of “derivative work,” but explained: 
“Although derivative works that are subject to the author’s copyright 
transform an original work into a new mode of presentation, such 
works—unlike works of fair use—take expression for purposes that are 
 
 142 Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The More Things Change the Less They Seem 
“Transformed”: Some Reflections on Fair Use, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y. U.S. 251, 259–60 (1999) 
(emphasis in the original). The reference to Lewis Carroll invokes his character of Humpty-
Dumpty, who insisted: “When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean—neither 
more nor less.” Id. at 252 n.5 (quoting LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS—AND 
WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 94 (1946)). 
 143 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 144 Zimmerman, supra note 142, at 251–52 & n.2. 
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not ‘transformative.’”145 More recently, in Cariou v. Prince, the Second 
Circuit considered thirty works in which appropriation artist Richard 
Prince reproduced and then modified copyrighted works by 
photographer Patrick Cariou without permission. The court found 
twenty-five of these thirty works to be fair uses as a matter of law, on 
grounds that “Prince’s composition, presentation, scale, color palette, 
and media are fundamentally different and new compared to the 
photographs, as is the expressive nature of Prince’s work.”146 But—citing 
Castle Rock on the relationship between derivative works and fair 
use147—it remanded for further findings regarding the other five 
works.148 Its reasoning is an encapsulation of the No True Scotsman at 
work: “[W]e cannot say for sure . . . whether Prince has transformed 
Cariou’s work enough to render it transformative.”149 
The twisting and turning language in these cases does not seem to 
be invoking the Trump Card—that is, these courts do not hold that if a 
defendant’s use is transformative, it is perforce not a derivative work, or 
that a defendant’s use that transforms the plaintiff’s work is perforce not 
fair.150 Instead, many courts appear to treat the category of derivative 
works and the category of fair uses as if they have no determinate 
relationship to one another—and in doing so are able to superficially 
avoid the contradiction presented in our formal model. The No True 
Scotsman allows them to do so by working at the level of the individual 
 
 145 Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 143. 
 146 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706–10 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 147 Id. at 708. 
 148 Id. at 710–11. 
 149 Id. at 711. 
 150 Indeed, one district court that held as much was criticized by Professor Reese as “clearly 
incorrect.” Reese, supra note 141, at 469–70, quoting Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 
433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1242 (D. Colo. 2006) (“[B]ecause the infringing copies of these movies are 
not used in a transformative manner, they are not derivative works and do not violate 
§ 106(2).”) (internal quotations omitted). The Seventh Circuit has similarly criticized Second 
Circuit caselaw on grounds that it commits the same error. Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 
F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1555 (2015) (“To say that a new use 
transforms the work is precisely to say that it is derivative and thus, one might suppose, 
protected under § 106(2). Cariou and its predecessors in the Second Circuit do no explain how 
every ‘transformative use’ can be ‘fair use’ without extinguishing the author’s rights under 
§ 106(2).”). As we will see, however, the Seventh Circuit is confusing the substance of the 
Second Circuit’s approach to this particular doctrinal problem with the structure of that 
approach. See infra Part IV. 
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uses at issue in each case, finding that the defendant’s conduct falls 
within one of the two conflicting categories and summarily asserting it 
does not fall within the other. For example, the court in Micro Star v. 
FormGen Inc. provided a lengthy analysis to support its conclusion that 
the defendant had created an unauthorized derivative work by creating 
additional levels for plaintiff’s copyrighted video game, and then 
proceeded to dismiss the question of transformativeness in a single 
sentence buried in a footnote.151 Similarly, the court in Nihon Deizai 
Himbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, Inc.—in which the defendant 
had prepared English-language abstracts of plaintiff’s Japanese-language 
articles—the court performed a thorough analysis of plaintiff’s 
derivative-works-right claim, then in two sentences concluded that the 
defendant’s uses were “not in the least transformative” because they 
were “for the most part direct translations . . . [that] added almost 
nothing new.”152 In both cases, the courts’ assertion that the defendants’ 
uses of the plaintiffs’ works were not “transformative” seems 
inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the term. But as Castle Rock 
suggests with its use of scare quotes, just because a derivative work 
“transforms” the plaintiff’s expression, that does not make such a work 
“transformative” as a legal matter.153 
Such a distinction between the ordinary meaning and the legal 
meaning of a particular term as applied to a particular case is a hallmark 
of the No True Scotsman. Rhetorically at least, such distinctions are 
fairly common—indeed, they are often signaled with scare quotes—and 
they help to resolve a case without disturbing a model of the universe of 
discourse that depends on the disjointness of two sets at issue in the 
case. The earlier history of the doctrine we investigated in the previous 
section—the law of patentable subject matter—provides additional 
examples of this dynamic. In Parker v. Flook, for instance, the Court 
conceded that the applicant’s method “is a ‘process’ in the ordinary 
sense of the word,”154 but also noted that the Court’s earlier holding in 
 
 151 The entirety of the court’s analysis of the transformativeness of the defendant’s use was: 
“[It] can hardly be described as transformative; anything but.” Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 
F.3d 1107, 1113 n.6 (9th Cir. 1998).  
 152 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 153 See supra text accompanying notes 143–45.  
 154 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 (1978). 
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Gottschalk v. Benson155 “forecloses a purely literal reading of § 101.”156 
Indeed, in Benson the Court had telegraphed the availability of the No 
True Scotsman move, framing the issue in that case as “whether the 
method described and claimed is a ‘process’ within the meaning of the 
Patent Act.”157 (The fact that these opinions used language suggesting a 
No True Scotsman in a universe of discourse that we ultimately 
identified with the Trump Card presents interesting theoretical issues 
that will be explored below.) 
In both the older patentable subject matter cases and the more 
recent fair use cases, courts are distinguishing between the ordinary 
meaning of certain intensional definitions and the legal meaning of 
those definitions in application to a particular state of the world. In other 
words, they are asking whether this process is a true “process,” or this 
transformation is truly “transformative.” In formal terms, the No True 
Scotsman can be represented in our model of the universe of discourse 
with a single move—evaluating the troublesome predicate in such a way 
as to remove the contradictory membership relation: 
¬ W(n) 
∴ n ∉ H 
Graphically, the move can be depicted thus: 
 
 
 155 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
 156 Flook, 437 U.S. at 588–89. 
 157 Benson, 409 U.S. at 64 (emphasis added). 
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Figure 18 
 
The No True Scotsman is a strategy that releases the immediate 
pressure of an apparent contradiction, but in doing so only increases the 
strain on the logical structure that created the contradiction in the first 
place. As cases that seem on their face to fall within the natural-language 
intensional predicate of one doctrinal set are placed outside that set by 
particular acts of ad hoc adjudication, the coherence of doctrinal sets 
across time and circumstance becomes difficult to maintain—the link 
between set predication and set membership begins to break down. 
Because law is a human institution, such incoherence can endure for a 
surprisingly long time without stimulating any radical reorganization of 
set-theoretic models. Indeed, Flew predicted as much in identifying the 
No True Scotsman as a feature of human psychology. Recall his original 
example: The case of Agnus MacSporran should probably have led the 
Scottish chauvinist to reevaluate the role of the category “Scotsmen” in 
his model of the relevant universe of discourse. In particular, it ought to 
have led him to reconsider whether members of this category all share 
the distinctive characteristics he ascribes to them (i.e., whether the 
category “Scotsmen” has a nonempty intersection with the category of 
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“people who would do such a thing”). But Flew thinks such reevaluation 
is unlikely—that we are resistant to revising our set-theoretic models of 
the world around us if we can avoid it. As he puts it: “The temptation of 
course is not just to slide, under the pressure of falsification, . . . [i]t is to 
fail to recognize what has happened, and so to be apt to slide back again 
into the original interpretation immediately that pressure is 
removed.”158  
This psychological conjecture has some empirical support,159 and it 
is a particularly salient concern for legal analysis, reflected in the old 
adage that hard cases make bad law. It is precisely when the 
categorization of a set of facts as outside some seemingly applicable rule 
(e.g., Agnus MacSporran is no true Scotsman) is inconsistent with 
conventional understandings of the natural language in which that rule 
is framed (e.g., Agnus MacSporran is a native Aberdonian; Aberdeen is 
in Scotland) that we run the risk of inconsistency in our set-theoretic 
models. This inconsistency, as Flew’s example suggests, may often arise 
from results-oriented decision-making, and it can thus pose a direct 
threat to the rule of law.160 But the common law has a built-in check on 
this kind of free-wheeling ad hoc decision-making: the recursive process 
of extensional set-building that we earlier identified with the institution 
 
 158 FLEW, supra note 125, at 50. Similar tendencies have been flagged in philosophical 
debates under the name of “humpty-dumptying” or “motte-and-bailey doctrines.” See generally 
Nicholas Shackel, The Vacuity of Postmodernist Methodology, 36 METAPHILOSOPHY 295 (2005). 
 159 See generally, e.g., Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning., 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
480 (1990); Dan M. Kahan, Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection: An 
Experimental Study, 8 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 407 (2012); Ziva Kunda & Lisa Sinclair, 
Motivated Reasoning with Stereotypes: Activation, Application, and Inhibition, 10 PSYCHOL. 
INQUIRY 12 (1999). 
 160 The rule of law is obviously a complex and contested concept, but for present purposes it 
simply refers to some standard of rationality and consistency in the application of legal rules. 
For more on the concept, see generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in 
Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997); cf. Dworkin, supra note 76, at 1064 
(“Judges, like all political officials, are subject to the doctrine of political responsibility. This 
doctrine states, in its most general form, that political officials must make only such political 
decisions as they can justify within a political theory that also justifies the other decisions they 
propose to make. The doctrine seems innocuous in this general form; but it does, even in this 
form, condemn a style of political administration that might be called, following Rawls, 
intuitionistic. It condemns the practice of making decisions that seem right in isolation, but 
cannot be brought within some comprehensive theory of general principles and policies that is 
consistent with other decisions also thought right.”). 
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of precedent.161 This process is key to the final contradiction-avoidance 
strategy we must review. 
D.     The Tertium Quid 
The No True Scotsman ties the disposition of a case to the specific 
facts of that case. In so doing, it purports to limit the effect of the 
adjudication of the case on the model of the applicable doctrinal 
universe of discourse—and particularly on the predicate for the set from 
which the case is to be excluded. But because the outcome of a common-
law adjudication has precedential value independent of the announced 
rationale for that outcome, such efforts to limit a case to its facts are 
inherently unstable. As Professor Schauer notes, it may be that law, as 
an institution, inherently requires outcomes to be justified with reasons 
that extend beyond the facts of a single case.162 Thus, overt efforts by 
courts to limit cases to their facts generally fail.  
In intellectual property law we see an example of this dynamic in 
the history of the doctrine of common-law misappropriation. A federal 
common-law claim for misappropriation was recognized by the 
Supreme Court in International News Service v. Associated Press,163 in 
which a wire service sued its competitor for copying its news stories 
from East Coast newspapers and selling them to West Coast newspapers 
at a discount. The Court held that the defendant could be held liable for 
“appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have sown,”164 
dismissing any potential contradiction with the Copyright Act’s 
exclusion of factual material from exclusive ownership with a wave of its 
hand: “We need spend no time . . . upon the general question of 
property in news matter at common law, or the application of the 
copyright act, since it seems to us the case must turn upon the question 
of unfair competition in business.”165 
Recognizing that this doctrinal contradiction could not be so 
casually dismissed, Judge Learned Hand undertook in the case of 
 
 161 See supra Section II.C. 
 162 Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 653 & n.60 (1995). 
 163 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
 164 Id. at 239–40. 
 165 Id. at 234–35. 
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Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp. to limit INS v. AP to its facts.166 Judge 
Hand treated INS v. AP as an example of a No True Scotsman—“where 
the occasion is at once the justification for, and the limit of, what is 
decided.”167 But his approbation notwithstanding, the misappropriation 
cause of action continues to be asserted in the Second Circuit to this 
day. In National Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc.,168 the court listed the 
elements of the cause of action in general terms—deriving them 
primarily from the facts of INS.169 And those elements have now become 
the basis for a family of cases in which claims are asserted for 
misappropriation of “hot news”—the category of information that was 
found to have been misappropriated in INS.170 
This tendency of individual cases to become the seeds of 
intensionally-defined doctrinal sets—even where courts go to great 
lengths to prevent them from doing so—is an inevitable consequence of 
the recursive nature of the common law. As discussed in Section II.C 
above, doctrinally relevant sets may be constructed not only 
intensionally, based on predicates found in the language of statutes or 
judicial opinions, but extensionally, by collating and reconciling the 
facts and results of individual cases that have precedential value. And in 
areas of doctrine that tend to generate No True Scotsmen—areas where 
existing intensional definitions conflict to the point where courts are 
categorizing cases within or without those definitions on a seemingly ad 
hoc basis—the recursive process of cataloguing and comparing the facts 
and outcomes of these cases tends toward the development of some new 
intensional definition emergent from the cases themselves. We saw an 
example of this process in Kremen’s effort to reconcile two inconsistent 
definitions of “property” for purposes of California conversion law.171 
Such a newly developed intensional principle is necessarily distinct from 
any pre-existing intensional definitions, which are therefore admitted to 
 
 166 Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929). 
 167 Id. 
 168 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 169 See id. at 852. 
 170 See, e.g., Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011). 
Dow Jones & Co. v. Real-Time Analysis & News, Ltd., No. 14 CIV. 131 JMF GWG, 2014 WL 
4629967 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2014) (default judgment), report and recommendation adopted, 
2014 WL 5002092 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2014). 
 171 See supra notes 87–96 and accompanying text. 
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provide an incomplete—or mistaken—model of the universe of 
discourse. The identification of—and reliance on—such a distinct and 
novel intensional principle is the last strategy for resolving doctrinal 
conflict. I will refer to it as the Tertium Quid. 
The Tertium Quid is an old work horse of the Langdellian case 
method. It is one of the first tricks picked up by the first-year American 
law student: to distill and generalize from the facts and outcomes of an 
apparently inconsistent set of cases some new abstract principle—
distinct from the principles explicitly relied on in the opinions 
themselves—to govern novel future cases.172 In the context of our model 
of doctrinal conflict, a hard-to-justify classification of a case as within or 
without an existing intensionally-defined set may suggest the need for a 
new set not accounted for in the existing model of the universe of 
discourse. Moreover, this new set may turn out to be more relevant to 
organizing the universe of discourse into the two universe-exhausting 
complementary sets we assign to binary adjudicative outcomes. Thus, in 
a common-law system, every No True Scotsman is the seed of a Tertium 
Quid, and every Tertium Quid has the capacity to supplant previously 
applicable doctrinal sets. 
The areas of intellectual property law we have already examined 
each provide some examples of efforts to deploy the Tertium Quid. In 
patentable subject matter, for example, the “product of nature” 
exclusion has been criticized as insufficient to explain the outcome of 
cases such as Myriad.173 As Dan Burk points out, the predicate “natural 
phenomenon” does not provide any principled basis for the Myriad 
Court’s distinction between a molecule of gDNA removed from its 
position in a human chromosome and a corresponding, exon-only 
cDNA molecule created in a lab. Neither molecule would have the same 
physical qualities as the corresponding sequence of nucleotides found in 
vivo within in a human cell.174 Burk thus concludes that the “product of 
 
 172 See, e.g., Todd D. Rakoff & Martha Minow, A Case for Another Case Method, 60 VAND. L. 
REV. 597, 598–99 (2007) (“[S]tudents would be expected to work not only from the particular 
to the general, but also from the general to the particular.”). 
 173 The Myriad Court itself alternately justified its holding under the “law of nature” 
exception, Ass’n of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013), and 
the “product of nature” exception, id. at 595. 
 174 Dan L. Burk, Edifying Thoughts of a Patent Watcher: The Nature of DNA, 60 UCLA L. 
REV. DISC. 92, 98–101 (2013). 
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nature” exclusion from patentable subject matter is generally unhelpful: 
“At its endpoints, the doctrine either proves everything or proves 
nothing. Either everything is a product of nature—drawn from and 
existing in the world—or nothing is a product of nature—having been 
intellectually and socially constructed by human cognition.”175 He 
argues that instead, courts should—and perhaps do—resolve patentable 
subject matter cases by reference to an anti-preemption principle: that 
“the basic tools of scientific and technological work” are not 
patentable.176 This anti-preemption criterion is a Tertium Quid: a new 
predicate that supposedly offers a superior basis for the mapping of 
cases to binary outcomes within the universe of discourse. 
The indeterminacy generated by the contradiction between fair use 
doctrine and the derivative works right in copyright has similarly 
spawned efforts to deploy the Tertium Quid. Anthony Reese, for 
example, cites various Court of Appeals opinions to argue that 
“transformativeness” does not refer to transformation of a copyrighted 
work, but rather to the use of such a work for a different purpose than 
the purpose for which the copyright owner uses it.177 Under this new 
intensional definition of the relevant doctrinal set, “even making an 
exact copy of a work may be transformative so long as the copy serves a 
different function than the original work.”178 Of course, the same 
indeterminacy that makes the Tertium Quid attractive makes it 
extremely useful in contesting any new model of the universe of 
discourse. Professor Ginsburg, for example, has proposed dividing up 
the universe of transformative uses even more finely—to exclude from 
the fair use defense transformative purposes that are not authorial 
purposes (i.e., where the transformative purpose is to drive a new 
business model, such as online search).179  
To formalize the Tertium Quid, let us turn to an example from 
another branch of intellectual property law: trademarks. Courts have 
 
 175 Id. at 101. 
 176 Id. at 102 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). A similar line of 
analysis suggests that the Supreme Court’s “abstract ideas” jurisprudence is being subsumed by 
the search for an “inventive concept.” See, e.g., Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent-
Eligible Processes: An Audience Perspective, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 349, 377–83 (2015). 
 177 Reese, supra note 141, at 485. 
 178 Id. (quoting Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
 179 See generally Ginsburg, supra note 140. 
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long struggled with the application of trademark liability to defendants 
who are using a plaintiff’s trademarks—at least in part—for expressive 
purposes. Rochelle Dreyfuss summarized the dilemma in a 1989 article: 
[Traditionally, trademark] claims focused on the impact of the mark 
on purchasing decisions. By the same token, defenses centered on the 
commercial requirements of the competitive marketplace. The terms 
that delimited the reach of trademark law—consumer confusion, gap 
bridging, fair use, genericity, abandonment—were understood 
strictly by reference to these commercial interests. But as trademark 
owners have begun to capitalize on the salience of these symbols in 
the culture, the justifications that formerly delineated the scope of the 
law have lost significance. . . . Lacking the traditional analytical tools 
provided by trademark law, courts have lately attempted to apply 
first amendment jurisprudence to such claims. . . . [A]lthough the 
Constitution supplies a normative principle favoring public access to 
the tools of expression, the body of law that has developed under the 
first amendment provides a surprisingly uncongenial framework for 
analysis.180 
The basic problem of doctrinal structure is a familiar one: In some cases, 
the rule applying liability for trademark infringement contradicts the 
rule insulating expression from legal liability. Specifically, liability for 
infringement attaches when a defendant uses a plaintiff’s trademark in a 
way that is “likely to cause confusion . . . as to the affiliation, connection, 
or association of [defendant] with [plaintiff], or as to the origin, 
sponsorship, or approval of [the defendant’s] goods, services, or 
commercial activities by [plaintiff].”181 But the First Amendment 
generally forbids imposing legal liability based on the content of one’s 
expression.182 In cases where a defendant uses a trademark in an 
expressive way, and thereby causes confusion, we have our familiar 
contradiction. 
 
 180 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi 
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 398 (1989). 
 181 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2018). 
 182 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
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Once again, we can model this contradiction both formally and 
graphically. Formally, our universe of discourse includes the following 
definitions: 
A = {x: x is a use of a trademark that is likely to cause consumer 
confusion} 
H = {x: x is a form of constitutionally protected expression} 
A ⊆ E 
H ⊆ K 
Graphically, we can again represent our model of trademark 
doctrines as structurally identical to our model of patentable subject 
matter doctrine and copyright fair use doctrine. We again complete the 
model by positing some case n in which the defendant has engaged in 
conduct that is both “a use of a trademark that is likely to cause 
consumer confusion” and “a form of constitutionally protected 
expression,” and arrive at the now-familiar picture of our universe of 
discourse: 
 
Figure 19 
 
While we might expect that a conflict between a constitutional 
provision and a statutory cause of action would ordinarily be resolved 
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via the Trump Card,183 courts deciding trademark cases have not 
consistently invoked that strategy when faced with First Amendment 
defenses. Instead, for some time, they resorted to an implicit balancing 
analysis—weighing the seriousness of the confusion caused by the 
defendant’s activity against the importance of the speech interest 
underlying that activity. The resolution of this balancing analysis often 
invoked the No True Scotsman—a finding for the plaintiff or defendant 
based on a contestable assertion regarding the case’s satisfaction of one 
of the two applicable predicates. That is, in some cases the application of 
trademark liability was found not to impose serious burdens on 
expression;184 in others the expression at issue was deemed unlikely to 
cause any kind of confusion.185 
 
 183 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803) (“[A] law repugnant to the Constitution is 
void.”). 
 184 San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 539–40 (1987) 
(“The possibility for confusion as to sponsorship is obvious . . . [and t]he application of the Act 
to this commercial speech is not broader than necessary to protect the legitimate congressional 
interest and therefore does not violate the First Amendment.”); Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. 
Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he protection afforded by the First Amendment 
does not give Novak license to infringe the rights of Mutual. . . . Other avenues for Novak to 
express his views exist and are unrestricted by the injunction.”); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. 
Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Balducci’s ad parody was likely to confuse 
consumers as to its origin, sponsorship or approval. This confusion might have to be tolerated 
if even plausibly necessary to achieve the desired commentary—a question we need not decide. 
In this case, the confusion is wholly unnecessary to Balducci’s stated purpose.”); Dallas 
Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205–06 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(“The public’s belief that the mark’s owner sponsored or otherwise approved the use of the 
trademark satisfies the confusion requirement. . . . Plaintiff’s trademark is in the nature of a 
property right, and as such it need not yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under 
circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of communication exist.”) (internal citations 
and quotation marks omitted); cf. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. 
Supp. 869, 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“[T]he harm to the plaintiff resulting from the . . . likelihood of 
public confusion . . . could seriously impair the value and continued usefulness of its mark. The 
Patrol contends MGM’s suit is barred by the First Amendment. They contend that because the 
Patrol is engaged in political speech, it is less subject to the trademark laws. There is no legal 
support for this position. The seriousness and virtue of a cause do not confer any right to the 
use of the trademark of another.”). 
 185 Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 934 (D.D.C. 1985) (“Defendants use 
star wars in the body of their message in a descriptive manner to communicate ideas, rather 
than to create confusion as to sponsorship.”); Girl Scouts of U.S. v. Personality Posters Mfg. 
Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228, 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (“Even if we hypothesize that some viewers might 
at first blush believe that the subject of the poster is actually a pregnant Girl Scout, it is highly 
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Eventually, however, this type of ad hoc adjudication—and its 
reliance on the No True Scotsman—came to be replaced by the Tertium 
Quid. In Rogers v. Grimaldi, the Second Circuit imposed a new structure 
on the analysis applicable to the unauthorized use of trademarks in 
certain expressive contexts: 
We believe that in general the [Lanham] Act should be construed to 
apply to artistic works only where the public interest in avoiding 
consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression. 
In the context of allegedly misleading titles using a [protectable 
trademark], that balance will normally not support application of the 
Act unless the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work 
whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the title 
explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work.186 
The Rogers test explicitly acknowledged a category of cases in which the 
two contradictory doctrinal sets may intersect—cases involving artistic 
works whose titles include someone else’s trademark—and constructed 
a new model of that doctrinal space. The most important implication of 
this move is to suggest that the pre-existing model of the universe of 
discourse—and in particular the intensionally defined sets that had been 
thought to map to binary outcomes—are no longer helpful in 
determining at least some relevant membership relations between cases 
and outcomes. The identification of a new intensional definition of a 
relevant set of cases, which intersects at least in part with the 
 
doubtful that any such impression would be more than momentary or that any viewer would 
conclude that the Girl Scouts had printed or distributed the poster.”); cf. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. 
Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1987) (“The district court’s application of the 
Maine anti-dilution statute to appellant’s noncommercial parody cannot withstand 
constitutional scrutiny. Drake has not used Bean’s mark to identify or market goods or services; 
it has used the mark solely to identify Bean as the object of its parody.”). 
 186 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). The mark in question in Rogers was 
the name of the famous dancer Ginger Rogers, which she claimed was being unfairly used in 
the title of the Federico Fellini film “Ginger and Fred.” Rogers asserted that the title gave rise to 
a false endorsement claim under the Lanham Act, in essence claiming her name served as a 
protectable trademark—a claim that has been recognized by the federal courts in other 
contexts. See 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 28:15 (5th ed. 2018) (“Courts hold that in the context of § 43(a)(1)(A), 15 
U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1)(A), a human persona or identity is a kind of ‘trademark’ which is 
infringed by a false endorsement.”) (citing cases).  
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intersection of the pre-existing contradictory sets, is the defining feature 
of the Tertium Quid. Graphically, we can model the move as follows: 
 
Figure 20 
 
The mere assertion of the existence of this new relevant set N does 
not in itself provide any information about the relationship between N 
and the binary outcomes in the universe of discourse. That is, the 
Tertium Quid does not imply any particular relationship between the 
new set N and the ultimate complementary sets E and K—only that 
there exists some such relationship (for at least some subset of N), and 
that this relationship takes precedence over the inclusion relationships 
between A and E on the one hand and H and K on the other.187 
 
 187 Formally, we can represent the logic of this move as follows: 
∃(N)[N ∩ (A ∩ H) ≠ Ø] 
n ∈ N 
∃(Z)[(Z ⊆ N) ∧ ([Z ⊆ E] ⊕ [Z ⊆ K])] 
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For an example of the ways such a newly identified set can be 
mapped to binary outcomes, we can return to Rogers. Within the new 
set Rogers had identified (i.e., titles of expressive works that contain 
someone else’s trademark), the court defined two new subsets and 
established their relations to the ultimate complementary sets defining 
the binary outcomes of interest. Each of these two subsets—cases in 
which the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work, and 
cases in which the title explicitly misleads as to the source or content of 
the work—were then included within the set corresponding to liability; 
by implication expressive works that were not members of either subset 
were immune from liability. “Ginger and Fred” was found not to fall 
within either of the identified subsets, and therefore not to subject its 
producers to liability.188 Formally we may model the analysis as follows: 
N = {x: x is an artistic work whose title contains someone else’s 
trademark} 
L = {x: x is an artistic work in which the inclusion of someone else’s 
trademark in the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work} 
M = {x: x is an artistic work in which the inclusion of someone else’s 
trademark in the title explicitly misleads as to the source or content of 
the work} 
L ⊆ N 
M ⊆ N 
(L ⋃ M) ⊆ E 
N – (L ⋃ M) ⊆ K 
n ∈ N 
n ∉ L 
n ∉ M 
∴ n ∈ K 
And we can also model the analysis graphically (representing only those 
features of the universe of discourse that are of immediate interest): 
 
 
Note an interesting implication of this formalization: as a matter of logical structure, the Trump 
Card is equivalent to a special case of the Tertium Quid in which N = (A ∩ H) = Z. 
 188 See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 21 
 
One interesting feature of the Tertium Quid is its durability in a 
common law system relative to the No True Scotsman. Since it was 
handed down, the framework of Rogers has been adopted by a growing 
number of federal courts hearing cases in which a trademark claim runs 
into a First Amendment defense. The Ninth Circuit adopted Rogers’ 
approach in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc.,189 and applied it to the 
content (as opposed to merely the title) of expressive works in E.S.S. 
Entertainment 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc.190 (The Second Circuit 
itself had extended Rogers to the content of expressive works almost 
immediately.191) Other Circuit Courts of Appeal have similarly adopted 
 
 189 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 190 547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 191 Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 
1989). 
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Rogers in one form or another.192 As of this writing it is the most cited 
American case dealing with the expressive use of trademarks.193  
As noted above,194 the recursive nature of common-law 
adjudication means that the use of a No True Scotsman in an existing 
area of doctrine always has the potential to establish and propagate a 
new intensional definition. The Tertium Quid, however, provides such a 
definition, and in so doing has the potential to bring considerable 
stability to an area of doctrine where consistency is lacking. That is, a 
precedent that announces a Tertium Quid as the rationale for its 
decision purports to instruct future courts that in the case of this 
particular doctrinal contradiction, they ought to resolve the 
contradiction in a particular way. The Trump Card similarly can 
stabilize inconsistent doctrine when announced as the rationale for a 
decision: It instructs future courts to apply one conflicting rule and 
ignore the other.195 The No True Scotsman lacks this quality, and does 
so because of its logical form: It speaks to the membership relations 
between a case and a legal set, but says nothing about the relationships 
between the legal sets whose inconsistency required its invocation. In 
the next Part, we will attempt to connect this relationship between the 
form of the various contradiction-avoidance strategies and the evolution 
of the universes of discourse in which they arise to deeper theoretical 
issues in the analysis of common-law legal systems. 
 
 192 See, e.g., Radiance Found., Inc. v. N.A.A.C.P., 786 F.3d 316, 329 (4th Cir. 2015); Univ. of 
Alabama Bd. of Trustees v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1278 (11th Cir. 2012); Parks v. 
LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 451 (6th Cir. 2003); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball 
Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 971–72 (10th Cir. 1996); Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, 
Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 665 (5th Cir. 2000); cf. Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 157 (3d Cir. 
2013) (“While the [Rogers] Test may have a use in trademark-like right of publicity cases, it is 
inapposite here.”). 
 193 Westlaw Key Number Search 382Tk1524 (Trademarks>Violations of Rights>Defenses, 
Excuses, and Justifications>Justified or Permissible Uses>Expressive Use; Commentary) (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2019); see also Westlaw Key Number Search 92k1604 (Constitutional 
Law>Freedom of Speech, Expression, and Press>Trade or Business>Trademarks and Trade 
Names) (last visited Mar. 25, 2019) (second most cited case, after Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 
(1979), a commercial speech/occupational licensing case). 
 194 See supra notes 172–74 and accompanying text. 
 195 Again, this makes sense insofar as we have established that the Trump Card is formally a 
special case of the Tertium Quid. See supra note 187. 
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E.     Summary 
We are now in a position to provide a graphical summary and 
decision tree for the various formal contradiction-resolution strategies 
reviewed in this Part. Both are provided in Figures 22 and 23 below. 
This summary presents an array of formal options by which an advocate 
may argue—or a judge may decide—an issue in an area of law where 
rules conflict. The next Part will discuss some implications of the model 
heretofore developed, as well as some of its limitations and its 
interactions with other aspects of legal theory. 
 
Figure 22 
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Trump Card Tertium Quid 
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Figure 23 
IV.     IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
With a thorough understanding of how various moves in legal 
practice can be modeled using set theory, we can begin to explore some 
of the implications of these models, and the ways in which a set-
theoretic model of legal practice interfaces with other aspects of legal 
theory. In this Part, I will sketch out ways in which the set-theoretic 
model developed above can provide a framework within which more 
established approaches to legal theory can do their work. The model 
does so principally by cutting through ambiguities of language that 
bedevil both the practice of law and the arguments of legal theorists. In 
doing so, it provides reasons to believe that certain topics of 
jurisprudential interest and debate can be helpfully understood as 
emergent—and perhaps inevitable—properties of the set-theoretic 
structure of a common-law system. 
A.     What the Set-Theoretic Model Is, and What It Is Not 
I have been referring to the set-theoretic model of legal practice as 
a formal model to distinguish it from substantive models of law or legal 
practice—the typical concerns of legal theory. Legal theorists generally 
deal with what we might call the substance of legal systems—ontological 
P(n) ∧ W(n); 
n ∈ A ∧ n ∈ H; 
A ∩ H = Ø   
 (⊥) 
¬W(n); 
n ∉ H 
No True 
Scotsman 
W(n) 
(⊥) 
(A – H) ⊆ E; 
H ⊆ K; 
 Trump Card 
∃(N)[N ∩ (A ∩ H) ≠ Ø];  
n ∈ N; 
∃(Z)[(Z  ⊆  N) ∧ ([Z  ⊆  E] ⊕ [Z  ⊆ K])] 
Tertium Quid 
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concepts such as Hart’s “rule of recognition”196 or Dworkin’s “grounds 
of law”197; prescriptive agendas that motivate debates between textualists 
and purposivists, or originalists and dynamists;198 psychological theories 
of what judges “actually” do, such as those that divide realists and anti-
realists;199 and so on. The set-theoretic model developed in this Article 
can accommodate any of these substantive theories, because its goals are 
relatively modest in comparison to such sweeping ideological projects. It 
aims only to provide a formal language to describe the behaviors that 
put any such substance into practice. As I hope will become apparent, 
this modest ambition is still a worthy one, and illuminates important 
aspects of legal practice and even of legal theory, but it necessarily omits 
certain features that some theorists might deem important to a model of 
a legal system. 
First, the set-theoretic model lacks any theory of empirical 
validation. It cannot tell us when a particular fact in the world is true or 
false. Thus, when evaluation of a case’s membership in a legal set 
requires some knowledge about the state of the world, we require some 
means from outside the model for obtaining and evaluating that 
knowledge. These external means may also be channeled through law, 
and that body of law may itself be modeled using sets—as with the law 
of evidence, rules allocating fact-finding responsibility, burdens of proof 
and persuasion, and procedural law generally.200 But a set-theoretic 
model of substantive law takes the outputs of these aspects of the legal 
system as inputs into other universes of discourse; they are 
complementary parts of a larger whole. The key point is that the set-
theoretic model itself does not purport to provide any mechanism for 
determining such empirical facts—though it may be able to model 
systems (particularly legal systems) that do. 
 
 196 HART, supra note 8, at 94–110. 
 197 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 4–6 (1986). 
 198 Even the recent empirical turn in the debate is substantive, to the extent it seeks to 
discern what motivates judicial acts of interpretation. See generally William Baude, Is 
Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015). 
 199 See generally Leiter, supra note 12. 
 200 An especially persuasive account of how legal systems arrive at such determinations can 
be found in the “fuzzy logic” model developed by Kevin Clermont. Kevin M. Clermont, 
Conjunction of Evidence and Multivalent Logic, in LAW AND THE NEW LOGICS (H. Patrick 
Glenn & Lionel D. Smith eds., 2017). 
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Second, the set-theoretic model lacks what Schauer calls a “rule of 
relevance”: an “organizing standard specifying which similarities 
[between cases] are important and which we can safely ignore.”201 Such 
rules are a focus of other efforts to model the logic of law and other 
deontic systems,202 and their omission is felt in two aspects of my model. 
First, knowing how to model the formulation and conflict of legal rules, 
or even the resolution of that conflict, does not necessarily help us 
identify whether a particular rule is implicated in a particular case. It 
does not, for example, provide any route to generate the statement “this 
series of events may give rise to a negligence claim,” or “this statute may 
pose a free exercise problem,” or “this litigant may have a justification 
defense.” Second, understanding that legal sets may be constructed 
extensionally from collections of cases does not tell us (beyond 
identification of a prevailing party) how to identify which cases belong 
together and which ones do not, let alone how best to formulate an 
intensional predicate for a set constructed in this way. For either of 
these important tasks, we need some theory of relevance from outside 
the model. In short, the model cannot tell us which set predicates to 
evaluate against a particular case or group of cases; it can only provide a 
framework for that evaluation once the relevant predicates have been 
identified (or constructed).203 For the present, I am content to 
hypothesize that such rules of relevance are, like the conflict-resolution 
strategies described above, best understood as emerging from legal 
practice rather than supposedly abstract legal substance. 
 
 201 Schauer, supra note 98, at 577–78. 
 202 See, e.g., NAVARRO & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 7, at 166–75 (citing CARLOS ALCHOURRÓN 
& EUGENIO BULYGIN, NORMATIVE SYSTEMS 103, 107 (1971)). 
 203 These missing theories of relevance are likely the province of professional training, and 
more generally of social context. See Schauer, supra note 98, at 578 (rules of relevance “are 
contingent upon both time and culture”); Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. 
REV. 379, 407 (1985) (“After all, the question whether a piece of text (such as a rule or a 
standard) applies to a given context is a function of context.”); Jack M. Balkin, The Framework 
Model and Constitutional Interpretation, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 241, 248 (David Dyzenhaus & Malcom Thorburn eds., 2016) (“[A]t any 
point in time, some proposed interpretations are ‘off-the-wall,’ while others are plausible or 
‘on-the-wall,’ even if they are not necessarily the best interpretation. . . . [T]he boundary 
between what people regard as reasonable and unreasonable is not fixed; it can change as a 
result of legal discussion and political mobilization.”). 
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Third, and finally, the model does not itself provide any guidance 
on which of the three contradiction-avoidance strategies a legal actor 
ought to use in any particular situation. We could imagine that such 
guidance might be part of a legal system, as a matter of positive law. We 
have already noted examples of such guidance in our own legal system: 
the Model Penal Code’s treatment of lesser included offenses seems to 
require the Trump Card;204 Kremen’s preference for extensional set-
building implies that inconsistent cases should be resolved via the 
Tertium Quid.205 We can call these types of purported constraints on the 
set-theoretic moves available to legal actors reconciliation rules. A 
reconciliation rule, in this view, is any aspect of a legal system that 
purports to compel an actor within that system to choose one 
contradiction-avoidance strategy rather than another. As I will argue 
below, one of the most important implications of a set-theoretic model 
is that it casts serious doubt on the possibility that such reconciliation 
rules can in themselves be effective in constraining the behavior of legal 
actors. 
Even with these limitations, the types of analyses reviewed in this 
Article can be extremely helpful in organizing one’s thinking about how 
lawyers and judges do what they do (as I hope the previous Parts of this 
Article have demonstrated). Moreover, they can be helpful in clearing 
up ambiguities in theoretical discussions about law. That is not because 
the set-theoretic model is itself a model of what law “is” in some 
metaphysical sense, or that it is a prescriptive model of what judges or 
lawyers ought to do, or even that it describes what they believe they do 
or ought to do. Rather, it is because the set-theoretic model provides a 
language and a set of tools that allows the thinkers who investigate such 
problems to avoid talking past one another, and exposes some features 
of law as a social practice that emerge from the structure of the legal 
system itself. The remainder of this Part will sketch a few examples. 
 
 204 See supra Section II.B.2. 
 205 See supra Section II.C. 
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B.     Precision and Generality: Rules and Standards, Policies and 
Principles 
The rules-versus-standards dichotomy is one of the most familiar 
in legal theory. It has ossified into a routine set of pro-and-con 
arguments regarding the merits of bright-line rules and flexible 
standards: a “dialectic” that Pierre Schlag despairingly (or cynically) 
characterized as “irreducible.”206 Duncan Kennedy famously attempted 
to tie the distinction to ideological and political strands in adjudication: 
mapping “form” (the rule/standard design choice) to “substance” (the 
political and ideological implications of the design choice).207 The late 
Justice Scalia identified rules with the constraint of judicial discretion, 
and with his favored interpretive theory of originalism.208 Louis Kaplow 
built an economic model around the dichotomy, tying it to gradients in 
information costs and administration costs.209 In these scholarly 
treatments, the difference between rules and standards is treated as if it 
is usefully reducible to a single dimension or spectrum. But the logical 
characteristics that distinguish what we call rules from what we call 
standards are more complex than a one-dimensional gradient. And the 
failure to properly distinguish the multiple formal distinctions among 
what legal theorists refer to as “rules” or “standards” results in the 
jumbling together of distinct theoretical issues. The set-theoretic model 
can help cut through this ambiguity. 
One sense in which we might distinguish a rule from a standard 
involves evaluation of membership relations. In particular, it involves 
the extent to which a set’s boundary is clearly delineated by an 
intensional predicate. By formulating legal directives as sets, and 
diagramming them with Venn Diagrams, I do not mean to suggest that 
such directives always draw sharp boundaries between close cases. 
Whether the intensional predicate of a doctrinally relevant set clearly 
 
 206 Schlag, supra note 203, at 426. 
 207 See generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). 
 208 See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 
(1989). 
 209 See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 
557 (1992). 
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identifies what is in and what is out of that set depends on the words in 
which that predicate is framed and the state of the world (or our 
knowledge of the state of the world) against which it is evaluated. And 
when predicates are specified in natural language—as in a legal system 
they generally are—there will often be uncertainty over whether they are 
a truthful description of a particular state of the world, just because the 
correspondence of words to facts in the world is not perfect.210  
We can understand this aspect of the rules/standards dichotomy to 
refer to the precision of legal directives.211 Precision, as used here, refers 
to the degree of correspondence between natural language and the 
world: A more precise predicate reduces uncertainty in evaluating the 
membership relations between that predicate and facts in the world. For 
example, the directive “The terms of the President and Vice President 
shall end at noon on the 20th day of January”212 more precisely 
identifies constraints on the office of President than the directive “he 
shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”213; the classic precise 
predicate is the prohibition that “no person shall drive a vehicle at a 
speed in excess of fifty-five miles per hour.”214 
But there is another very different sense in which we might 
distinguish a rule from a standard. In the previous Part we focused on 
the possibility that two distinct legal directives might conflict, but of 
course it is also possible that they could coincide. That is: Two different 
legal directives might both require the same result in a particular case, 
but for different reasons. Often when there are two legal directives that 
coincide in this way, it is because one of the directives is framed in such 
a way as to address only a subset of the cases governed by the other 
directive. For example, the Equal Protection Clause—“nor shall any 
State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
 
 210 See generally Schauer, supra note 98. 
 211 This is the sense in which Timothy Endicott evaluates the “precision” (or its converse, 
“vagueness”) of legal texts, and it may be decomposed further into imprecision along various 
semantic dimensions, none of which are important to the distinction I am attempting to draw. 
See generally Timothy Endicott, The Value of Vagueness, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 14 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011). 
 212 U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1. 
 213 U.S. CONST. art. II § 3. 
 214 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1180(b) (2016). 
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of the laws”215—has purchase on legal disputes involving nearly every 
area of human interaction.216 Conversely, the command of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965—that “[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to 
voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied 
by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any 
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color”217—deals 
only with the narrower domain of state electoral rules. For legal disputes 
within that narrower domain, the Voting Rights Act might well generate 
the same outcomes as the Equal Protection Clause, even though the 
statute says nothing about other areas—such as education, or housing, 
or government benefits—that might come within the command of the 
constitutional provision. 
We can give this difference in scope a name: call it generality. 
Generality is a measure of the proportion of the conceptual space within 
a relevant universe of discourse to which a particular predicate may be 
relevant. In a nutshell, within our set-theoretic model, generality is a 
measure of the size of a legal set; precision is a measure of the sharpness 
of its boundary.218 Both precision and generality are relevant to the 
characterization of a legal directive as either a rule or a standard, but 
legal theorists often blur the two dimensions together.219 The result is 
that they conflate two very different points: one about the nature of legal 
 
 215 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 216 Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model 
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1972). 
 217 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437 (1965). 
 218 Cf. Adam M. Samaha, Levels of Generality, Constitutional Comedy, and Legal Design, 
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1733, 1744, 1749 (2013) (“[A]bstractness includes vagueness and other 
hindrances to ease of understanding. . . . Breadth . . . [involves the dimension along which a] 
source might be understood to bear on a broad range of circumstances or only a narrow corner 
of social life.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 219 One notable exception is Cass Sunstein’s theory of judicial minimalism, which—though 
it does not directly engage the rules/standards dichotomy—reflects in its concepts of “depth” 
and “width” features analogous (though not identical) to the ideas of “precision” and 
“generality” that I describe here. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL 
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 10–19 (1999). For example, Sunstein’s concept of 
“depth” has to do with the depth of theoretical principle underlying a particular disposition; 
generality does not speak to substantive theory, but rather to the concepts of inclusion—the 
idea that a particular case is representative of a broader set of cases, and that those cases can be 
tied together by a sufficiently encompassing intensional definition. See id. 
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directives framed in natural language, and the other about the behavior 
of legal actors engaging with one another over time.  
Take this representative passage from Kathleen Sullivan’s 
Foreword to the 1992 Supreme Court Issue of the Harvard Law Review: 
A legal directive is “rule”-like when it binds a decisionmaker to 
respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering 
facts. Rules aim to confine the decisionmaker to facts, leaving 
irreducibly arbitrary and subjective value choices to be worked out 
elsewhere. . . . A legal directive is “standard”-like when it tends to 
collapse decisionmaking back into the direct application of the 
background principle or policy to a fact situation. Standards allow for 
the decrease of errors of under- and over-inclusiveness by giving the 
decisionmaker more discretion than do rules. Standards allow the 
decisionmaker to take into account all relevant factors or the totality 
of the circumstances. Thus, the application of a standard in one case 
ties the decisionmaker’s hand in the next case less than does a rule.220 
Dean Sullivan’s initial definition of a rule invokes the dimension of 
precision—favoring “delimited” predicates and avoiding “arbitrary and 
subjective” ones. But her definition of a standard invokes the dimension 
of generality: a “background principle or policy” rather than the 
narrower, more focused directives that might be included within, or 
consistent with, such a policy. Moreover, her discussion of rule-like 
directives is about the characteristics of rules as tools for constraining 
legal actors. Rules (or standards) are the subject, legal actors the object. 
But the last sentence slides into the passive voice, masking a reversal of 
roles. When she discusses “the application . . . in one case” of a rule or a 
standard, the subject is the legal actor who does the applying; the rule 
(or standard) has become the object. That is, she has shifted into 
discussion of the selection of tools by legal actors. These two pairs of 
conflated concepts—precision with generality, and characteristics of 
rules with characteristics of behavior—bear unpacking. 
 
 220 Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules 
and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58–59 (1992) (emphasis added). 
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The problem with blurring together the concept of precision with 
the concept of generality is that the two are not strictly correlated.221 To 
be sure, the more general a legal directive is, the less precise it is likely to 
be, if only because a directive that purports to apply to a broad and 
diverse range of states of the world will necessarily be framed in words 
that have purchase on multiple diverse aspects of the world.222 But one 
can imagine highly general directives that are quite precise—for 
example: “always decide a legal dispute in favor of the party with the 
higher adjusted gross income on their previous year’s income tax 
return.” And of course, an imprecise directive might be quite specific—
for example: “No person shall open the door of a motor vehicle on the 
side available to moving traffic unless and until it is reasonably safe to 
do so.”223 Perhaps the most familiar example of the mutual 
independence of precision and generality can be seen in legislative 
delegations of regulatory authority. For example, Section 619 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act (the so-called “Volcker Rule”) prohibits banks from 
“acquiring or taking positions in [certain financial instruments] 
principally for the purpose of selling in the near term”;224 federal 
agencies then promulgated a presumption that a position held for less 
than sixty days constituted a violation of the rule.225 The generality of 
both directives is the same—they are directed to the same category of 
human conduct—but the precision of the directives is different—a 
presumption based on the passing of a fixed period of time as compared 
with a description of the “purpose” of the directive’s target. 
The distinction between the precision and generality of legal 
directives has important implications for the second set of concepts 
conflated in Dean Sullivan’s discussion: the characteristics of legal 
 
 221 See Samaha, supra note 218, at 1749–50 (diagramming the interaction between the 
author’s posited dimensions of “abstractness” and “breadth,” which have affinities with 
precision and generality as defined herein). 
 222 Cf. Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1990) (“[A]t what level of generality should the Court describe 
the right previously protected and the right currently claimed? The more abstractly one states 
the already-protected right, the more likely it becomes that the claimed right will fall within its 
protection.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 223 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1214 (1964). 
 224 12 U.S.C. §§ 1851(a)(1)(A), (h)(4), (h)(6) (2018). 
 225 17 C.F.R. § 255.3(b)(2) (2014). 
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directives and the practices of legal actors. This is because of the 
possibility of multiple directives at different levels of generality bearing 
on any given case, and the need for legal actors to choose from among 
them. These choices imply a dimension of legal discretion that goes 
beyond the imprecision of natural language—and the concomitant 
indeterminacy of the application of any particular rule to a case—to the 
underlying structure of a common-law system. Put simply, legal actors 
not only decide whether their case falls within the language of a legal 
directive, but also which of multiple directives at different levels of 
generality they will use to evaluate the case. Moreover, these two 
dimensions of discretion are independent of one another, and the latter 
dimension depends not (or not only) on the language in which a 
directive is framed, but—as the rest of this Part will explain—on the 
interactions among legal actors over time. 
The set-theoretic model is obviously not necessary for an 
appreciation of these distinctions lying under the surface of the 
rules/standards dichotomy. But, I contend, it is extremely useful in this 
regard, precisely because such distinctions emerge effortlessly from its 
foundational distinction between membership and inclusion, mapping 
to the relationship between cases and legal directives on the one hand, 
and among multiple legal directives on the other. The model thus not 
only brings clarity and precision to the debate over the rules/standards 
dichotomy, it also foregrounds (helpfully, in my view) the role of legal 
actors and their behaviors in the dilemmas that dichotomy supposedly 
presents. 
C.     Dimensions of Discretion: Precedent 
Another example from intellectual property law demonstrates the 
utility of the set-theoretic model in understanding how theoretical 
concerns about law emerge from the structure of interactions among 
legal actors over time. In this case, the theoretical concern is the nature 
of precedent, and particularly its ability to constrain legal actors. The 
doctrine of aesthetic functionality in trademark law, as explained in the 
Supreme Court case of Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.226 and its 
 
 226 514 U.S. 159 (1995). 
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progeny, prohibits any firm from attempting to protect any product 
feature as a trademark “if exclusive use of the feature would put 
competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage”227 by 
allowing monopolization of features that are “intended not to identify 
the source [of the product], but to render the product itself more useful 
or more appealing.”228 However, trademark law does allow producers to 
claim exclusive rights to “trade dress” product features229 provided that 
they have established “secondary meaning” for such features—that is, if 
a substantial portion of the consuming public has come to associate the 
product feature with one particular producer.230 A doctrinal conflict 
therefore arises with respect to product features that consumers demand 
for both reputation-related and non-reputation-related reasons. In 
recent litigation over Christian Louboutin’s red-soled stiletto shoes, the 
record presented exactly such a conflict. Louboutin himself had 
admitted that the red soles of his shoes were desirable because they were 
“engaging, flirtatious, memorable and . . . sexy,” but the record also 
established that “in the high-stakes commercial markets and social 
circles in which these things matter a great deal, the red outsole became 
closely associated with Louboutin.”231  
In deciding Louboutin’s motion for a preliminary injunction 
against Yves Saint Laurent (which was marketing shoes that were red all 
over, including their soles), District Judge Marrero invoked the Tertium 
 
 227 Id. at 165; see also Traffix Devices v. Mktg. Displays, 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001) (“It is proper 
to inquire into a ‘significant non-reputation-related disadvantage’ in cases of aesthetic 
functionality.”). 
 228 Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000). 
 229 Trade dress “involves the total image of a product and may include features such as size, 
shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics, or even particular sales techniques.” Two 
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 764 n.1 (1992) (quoting John H. Harland Co. v. 
Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983)). Trade dress may include not only 
aspects of a product’s packaging but of its design as well.  
 230 Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 211 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 
844, 851 & n.11 (1982)) (“[A] mark has acquired distinctiveness, even if it is not inherently 
distinctive, if it has developed secondary meaning, which occurs when, ‘in the minds of the 
public, the primary significance of a [mark] is to identify the source of the product rather than 
the product itself.’”) (modification in original). 
 231 Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 447–48 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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Quid by situating the case as a member of a newly identified set of cases 
involving the use of particular colors in fashion goods:  
[T]he Court must decide whether there is something unique about 
the fashion world that militates against extending trademark 
protection to a single color, although such registrations have 
sometimes been upheld in other industries. . . . [T]he Court cannot 
conceive that the Lanham Act could serve as the source of the broad 
spectrum of absurdities that would follow recognition of a trademark 
for the use of a single color for fashion items.232 
On appeal, the Second Circuit did not disturb Judge Marrero’s 
disposition of the preliminary injunction motion, but it emphatically 
rejected his inclusion-based Tertium Quid move, instead opining that 
he should have simply evaluated the membership relation between the 
case and a legal directive extracted from the text of the Qualitex opinion:  
Qualitex requires an individualized, fact-based inquiry into the 
nature of the trademark, and cannot be read to sanction an industry-
based per se rule. The District Court created just such a rule. . . . Even 
if Qualitex could be read to permit an industry-specific per se rule of 
functionality (a reading we think doubtful), such a rule would be 
neither necessary nor appropriate here.233 
However, rather than undertaking such an inquiry, the Second Circuit 
disposed of the case by evaluating a different membership relation. That 
is, rather than finding that the claimed mark was not functional under 
the test of Qualitex—as it said the District Court should have done—the 
Second Circuit concluded the trademark as claimed was not source-
identifying.234 This avoided the contradiction not only by using a 
 
 232 Id. at 451, 457. 
 233 Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 223 (2d 
Cir. 2012). 
 234 The Second Circuit opinion also determined—in what can only be categorized as an 
advisory opinion given its other holdings—that Louboutin’s claimed trademark was only 
partially (as opposed to completely) invalid. See id. at 227–28 (“[T]he record fails to 
demonstrate that the secondary meaning of the Red Sole Mark extends to uses in which the sole 
does not contrast with the upper—in other words, when a red sole is used on a monochromatic 
red shoe. . . . We therefore instruct the Director of the Patent and Trade Office to limit the 
registration of the Red Sole Mark to only those situations in which the red lacquered outsole 
contrasts in color with the adjoining ‘upper’ of the shoe. . . . [W]e hold that the Red Sole Mark is 
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different logical strategy, but by resort to different rules within the 
universe of discourse. 
The difference between the District Court and Court of Appeals 
opinions in Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent has little to do with the 
uncertain application of legal rules to the specific dispute before the 
courts. The precision of the doctrine of aesthetic functionality simply 
played no role. In both opinions, Louboutin’s claimed trademark was 
found unenforceable against Yves Saint Laurent—in the District Court 
because it was functional, in the Second Circuit because it was not 
source-identifying. Neither rationale is substantively inconsistent with 
the other. The primary reason to reverse the District Court’s resolution 
of the doctrinal conflict it faced was formal, and hinged on the recursive 
structure of a common-law system. That is, the Second Circuit’s reversal 
changed the prospective effect of the disposition of the dispute on the 
structure of the universe of discourse in which the conflict arose. The 
District Court would have reshaped that structure to prevent the 
contradiction it encountered from arising in the future as a matter of 
logical form. The Court of Appeals preferred to leave the existing 
structure—and its potential for contradiction—intact, rather than alter 
the model with a novel intensional definition of a heretofore 
unrecognized set (i.e., “color as a trademark for fashion items”). 
The Louboutin case demonstrates how courts can and do shape 
their behaviors with a view not only to the substance of their decisions, 
but to their effect on the formal structure of the universe of discourse 
within which those decisions are situated. It is a reminder of the 
theoretical insight that precedent is not only “backward-looking”—
insofar as it purports to base a present adjudication on adjudications of 
the past—but also “forward-looking”—insofar as the reasons for today’s 
decision purport to bind future legal actors.235 The legal directives 
announced in judicial opinions—like any legal authorities—may be 
framed in language that is more or less precise. But they may also be 
pitched at different levels of generality. Thus, on their face, at least, 
 
valid and enforceable as modified. . . . Having limited the Red Sole Mark as described above, 
and having established that the red sole used by YSL is not a use of the Red Sole Mark, it is 
axiomatic that we need not—and should not—address . . . whether the modified Mark is 
functional.”) (emphasis added). 
 235 DWORKIN, supra note 197, at 225; see generally Schauer, supra note 98. 
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inclusion moves—like the Tertium Quid and the Trump Card—make 
more substantial claims on the behavior of future legal actors than 
membership moves—like the No True Scotsman. For example, as a 
forward-looking precedent, the opinion: “we cannot find substantial 
equality in the educational opportunities offered white and Negro law 
students by the State [of Texas]”236 makes fewer claims on future legal 
disputes than the opinion: “[s]eparate educational facilities are 
inherently unequal.”237 
Legal actors with sophisticated understandings of the types of 
logical moves available to them can deploy those moves strategically, in 
a bid to shape the universe of discourse in a preferred direction over 
time.238 The normative desirability of such strategic behavior is beyond 
the scope of this article. But from a purely descriptive standpoint, we are 
confronted with two questions central to the nature of precedent: First, 
whether we think such strategic efforts are likely to be successful in 
influencing the behavior of future legal actors. And second, whether law 
can constrain such strategic efforts. The set-theoretic model does not 
provide complete answers to these questions, but it suggests that both 
answers are interconnected. Specifically, the indeterminacy baked into 
the structure of law as a social practice limits the power of any particular 
legal actor to leverage that indeterminacy in results-oriented ways. 
D.     Meta-Rules: Sets All the Way Down 
How might a legal actor constrain, in advance, a different legal 
actor’s later evaluation of a case? Such a project is beset with practical 
problems, which Hart famously identified with epistemic deficiencies of 
the would-be constrainer: “ignorance of fact” and “indeterminacy of 
aim.”239 But it also raises theoretical problems arising from the structure 
of law as a social practice, corresponding to the dimension of precision, 
 
 236 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633 (1950). 
 237 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 238 See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of 
Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001) (arguing that precedent 
can create a kind of “path dependence” that constrains future doctrinal development). 
 239 See HART, supra note 8, at 127–28; see also H. L. A. Hart, Discretion, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
652, 661–63 (2013). 
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the dimension of generality, and the set-theoretic interaction of 
directives that vary along both dimensions as precedents making claims 
on the behavior of legal actors over time. 
The ineliminable discretion that results from the imprecision of the 
language in which legal directives are wrought is a well-worn theoretical 
chestnut. For example, Hart’s famous example of a legal rule forbidding 
vehicles in the park240 is generally used as the jumping-off point for 
debates over the relation of a number of hypothetical states of the world 
to the word “vehicle”—that is, about the proper way to ascertain the 
relationship between a legal text and a state of the world.241 The 
theoretical architecture of interpretation—of which Hart’s exercise is a 
classic exemplar—is largely concerned with the application of rules to 
states of the world and with minimizing or resolving the uncertainty of 
such an exercise. So, for example, when originalists argue (either 
amongst themselves or with adversaries such as living constitutionalists) 
over the proper interpretation of legal texts,242 they are generally talking 
about interpretation of the meaning of the words of those texts—in light 
of whatever sources of meaning they deem acceptable—and whether 
that meaning is descriptive of the state of the world the legal actor is 
trying to evaluate.243 
 
 240 H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 
607 (1958). 
 241 See generally Pierre Schlag, No Vehicles in the Park, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 381 (1999). 
Typically the text in question is a statute or a constitutional provision, but the same general 
approach applies to rules derived from the text of judicial opinions. See Schauer, supra note 98, 
at 580–81 (“[T]he articulated characterization [within a judicial opinion] acts like a specifically 
formulated rule. . . . Where there is an articulated characterization, therefore, the question 
whether precedent can constrain may collapse into the question whether rules can constrain.”); 
see also Scalia, supra note 208, at 1177 (“[B]y making the[ir] mode of analysis relatively 
principled or relatively fact-specific, the courts can either establish general rules or leave ample 
discretion for the future.”). 
 242 For a recent brief overview of the debate over originalism—in all its flavors—see Baude, 
supra note 198, at 2351–63 (2015). For a review of the distinctions between originalists and a 
leading competing school—living constitutionalism—see generally Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual 
Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 353 (2007). 
 243 This is true even for those more recent and subtle theories that draw a distinction 
between “semantic meaning” and “legal meaning,” such as the interpretation/construction 
distinction championed by Larry Solum. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-
Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 103–08 (2010). 
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We have come to identify such an exercise with the set-theoretic 
concept of membership, and the uncertainty inherent in membership 
evaluations with the imprecision of natural language. But let us assume 
that a legal actor concludes that a particular directive is not predicative 
of the case they must resolve—perhaps through a contestable exercise of 
discretion in the evaluation of the case with respect to the directive’s 
imprecise language. How then should the legal actor resolve the case to a 
binary outcome? The notion of a universe of discourse implies that the 
case must be a member of some other set, predicated by some other legal 
directive.  
Perhaps this other directive is simply a default rule at a high level of 
generality—an example of the deontic-logical concept of 
“defeasibility.”244 Burdens of proof have this character: they direct an 
outcome in favor of the non-burdened party whenever the burdened 
party fails to establish membership in some set that would direct an 
outcome in their favor. But not all alternative sets have this default (or 
complementary) relationship to sets predicated by less general legal 
rules. As we have seen, sometimes multiple legal rules are implicated in 
a particular case, and they may conflict or coincide. Thus, evaluating a 
case’s membership in a particular rule-based set is not the sum total of a 
legal actor’s work. Rather, the actor must construct an internally 
consistent universe of discourse comprised of whatever rule-based sets 
she believes are implicated by her case—each of them mapping to 
adjudicative outcomes—and then situate her case within that universe of 
discourse.245 
This task is complicated by the dimension of generality, and the 
need to mind relationships among multiple legal directives pitched at 
different levels of generality. Nowhere is this complication more 
 
 244 See sources cited supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 245 One very recent and quite helpful effort to model this type of exercise using 
(nonmonotonic) default logic is Lawsky, supra note 22. Lawsky’s use of defeasible logic to 
formally model complex statutory regimes involving exceptions and qualifications is a major 
advance in modeling a universe of discourse defined by a single statute, or even a group of 
related statutes such as the tax code. However, the problem of selecting which authorities, rules, 
or principles are implicated in a particular case, and how they ought to be interpreted against 
one another when they do not themselves say how they should be so interpreted, would remain 
even if we accept that the logic of the individual implicated directives is defeasible rather than 
monotonic. 
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apparent than in the institution of precedent. The discussion of Kremen 
v. Cohen246 illustrated that a precedent can be read either extensionally 
or intensionally. Extensionally, at the extreme, it may contribute 
nothing more to a universe of discourse than “the facts treated by the 
judge as material, and . . . his decision as based on them”247—an element 
of one of the complementary sets predicative of binary outcomes, rather 
than a set in its own right. Intensionally, at the opposite extreme, the 
“articulated characterization” offered by a court as a justification for its 
decision—its reasoned opinion—may operate similarly to legislation, 
providing a directive whose precision and generality may be arbitrarily 
determined by the opining court itself, and which “constrains the use of 
subsequent and inconsistent characterizations.”248 Between these 
extremes, lawyers and theorists may argue about the relative domains of 
holding and dicta, and about the similarity and difference between the 
facts of precedent and those of some instant case—in short, about the 
appropriate level of generality at which to frame some directive derived 
from the precedent.249 A single precedent thus encapsulates the potential 
for conflicts between multiple intensionally framed legal authorities 
(such as statutes or constitutional provisions). 
Any effort to constrain a legal actor’s discretion will have to engage 
not only the actor’s evaluation of the relationship between the language 
of particular rules and the state of the world the actor is called on to 
evaluate according to such rules, but also her selection of which rules (at 
which level of generality) to include in her universe of discourse, as well 
as her selection of a strategy to resolve any conflicts among the rules she 
selects.250 The first task is the subject of rules of relevance, while the 
 
 246 See supra Section II.C. 
 247 Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 182 
(1930). 
 248 Schauer, supra note 98, at 579–80. 
 249 As Frederick Schauer has noted, every judicial opinion that contains more than a 
recitation of its facts and an outcome in some sense says more than is strictly necessary to the 
outcome of a case. Schauer, supra note 162, at 648 (“If a reason that can be narrower is for that 
reason dicta, then anything other than the announcement of an outcome is dicta.”). For a 
review of theoretical treatments of the holding/dicta dichotomy, see generally Michael 
Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2005). 
 250 For an effort to formally reconcile this tension, see generally Horty, supra note 75. 
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second is the subject of reconciliation rules.251 We can refer to such 
rules—which purport to direct a legal actor’s selection and application 
of doctrinal rules—as meta-rules. The question is whether an earlier-in-
time legal actor—for example, a legislator enacting a statute or a judge 
announcing a precedent—can create such meta-rules so as to effectively 
constrain a later-in-time actor’s performance of these analytic tasks. 
As I have said, the set-theoretic model, being purely descriptive, 
does not require or prescribe any such meta-rules. Nor will I defend any 
position on which such rules are desirable. But the model still allows us 
to draw some conclusions about their properties, to the extent they are 
included within a legal universe of discourse. To see why, we must 
consider that whatever the substance of these rules of relevance or 
reconciliation rules might be, they are still rules. That is, they purport to 
provide directives to guide the behavior of legal actors. They thus have 
all the set-theoretic characteristics of any other legal directive—
including the dimensions of precision and generality. They can be 
modeled—and manipulated—using any of the set-theoretic relations 
and operations reviewed in this Article. They therefore may present 
similar—if not worse—problems of linguistic imprecision, and more 
importantly will similarly be subject to formal discretion on the part of 
legal actors who are, in turn, subject to them. 
The famously contradictory judicial canons of statutory 
construction252 provide a familiar example. One of Llewellyn’s most 
stark examples of “dueling canons” is his third: “Statutes are to be read 
in the light of the common law,” but “[t]he common law gives way to a 
statute which is inconsistent with it.”253 Both of these canons purport to 
do the work of reconciliation rules: to tell us how to resolve a conflict 
between contradictory substantive rules derived from statute and 
common law. Llewellyn’s point was that there is little guidance in the 
law of interpretation as to which of these contradictory rules should 
govern in any particular case—which we can recognize as a claim 
regarding the non-existence of useful or widely accepted rules of 
 
 251 See supra Section IV.A. 
 252 See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the 
Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1949); Anita S. 
Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J. 909 (2015). 
 253 Llewellyn, supra note 252, at 401. 
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relevance. Of course, even if this were not so, any such rule of relevance 
would still be a rule that would require evaluation by the same legal 
actor: The rule of relevance would merely push the problem of 
discretion to a different degree of generality. Moreover, the application 
of either canon identified by whatever rule of relevance we adopt would 
also necessarily be ambiguous as among the formal strategies we 
reviewed in Part III. For example, we do not know whether a common-
law rule “giving way” requires an application of the Trump Card, or can 
be honored via application of a No True Scotsman or a Tertium Quid; if 
the last, we do not know what level of generality the new set should aim 
for. In short, neither canon informs a court how to determine whether a 
case before it ought instead to be evaluated against the canon not 
followed, nor whether the implicated statute (or common-law rule, as 
the case may be) should always, sometimes, or just in this instance 
prevail over the conflicting rule. If the answer to the latter question is 
“sometimes,” the canon provides no basis for determining when. 
Thus, even if either of these canons provided definitive guidance 
on whether a statutory rule or a contradictory common-law rule ought 
to govern the outcome of a particular dispute as a matter of relevance, 
neither that rule nor the selected canon would provide guidance on the 
form such a disposition should take as a matter of reconciliation. In 
other words, even meta-rules—those rules that might purport to cabin 
formal discretion—are themselves subject to formal discretion. 
Whatever one’s substantive views regarding, for example, the centrality 
of text, the legitimate sources of legal meaning, the relevant historical or 
reflective posture for interpretation, the allocation of power between 
judges and legislators, the nature of stare decisis, or the distinction 
between holding and dicta—such substantive commitments inevitably 
must be put to work in the ordinary language of legal authorities, and do 
their work in application to cases where such rules often contradict one 
another. It is the task of resolving these conflicts that affords legal actors 
a significant degree of formal—rather than merely substantive—
discretion. 
At this point we begin to approach the limits of the set-theoretic 
model. The model is, I think, a valuable tool for describing how legal 
actors do what they do. It is unhelpful, and makes no claims to be 
helpful, in describing what legal actors should do, or why they should do 
so, or what motivates them. For example, the model gives us no 
guidance as to which court—the District Court or the Second Circuit—
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had the better of the formal argument in Louboutin.254 It does not tell us 
whether the Kremen court should have “toe[d] the line” of the California 
Supreme Court’s articulated characterization of the law of conversion or 
instead built a new predicate around the extension of California cases 
resolving claims of conversion of intangible property.255 On either of 
these questions, some more substantive theory—indeed, some 
prescriptive theory—of the role of judges in a legal system is required. 
Such prescriptive theories are legion; they range from Justice 
Scalia’s “law of rules” to Cass Sunstein’s “minimalism.”256 But these 
theories do not have to do with the substance of legal rules. Nor have 
they anything to do with precision of legal rules—a dimension of 
linguistic indeterminacy that lacks this kind of normative freight. 
Rather, they are normative positions regarding the judge’s role in 
tending to the relations among legal sets. And the observation that such 
normative positions can themselves constrain legal actors’ behavior—if 
at all—only as meta-rules that share all the set-theoretic qualities of 
doctrinal rules suggests that the problem of discretion is one of infinite 
regress. As a matter of logical structure, law is sets “all the way down.”257 
Later-in-time legal actors will be constrained by doctrinal rules 
formulated in advance precisely to the extent that they share the would-
be constrainer’s selection and application of the appropriate meta-rules 
to evaluate against a particular state of the world, such that both actors 
would construct the same universe of discourse when faced with the 
same case. Discretionary and possibly strategic selection of membership 
or inclusion moves in the construction of a universe of discourse gives a 
legal actor significant power, not only to determine adjudicative 
outcomes, but also to shape the development of doctrine in ways that 
other legal actors at other points in time might disagree with. 
Conversely, however, each such act of discretion will influence future 
universes of discourse exactly to the extent that future legal actors allow 
 
 254 See supra Section IV.C. 
 255 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 256 See generally Hathaway, supra note 238. 
 257 John Robert Ross, Constraints on Variables in Syntax (Sept. 1967) (unpublished thesis, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with DSpace@MIT, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology) (“‘[W]e live on a crust of earth which is on the back of a giant turtle.’ . . . ‘But what 
does this second turtle stand on?’ persisted James patiently. To this, the little old lady crowed 
triumphantly, ‘It’s no use, Mr. James—it’s turtles all the way down.’”). 
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them to. Constraint, in this view, is no more or less than convergence of 
the logical moves underlying the behaviors of legal actors over time. In 
this view, discretion is—as realists claim—an ineliminable property of 
any system of category-based rules numbering more than one, while 
legal determinacy is—as positivists claim—a matter of social fact—of 
practice—rather than conceptual, logical, or moral necessity. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have developed a formal and structural model of 
legal systems based on the tools of naïve set theory. I have demonstrated 
how the tools of set theory may be applied to legal authorities and the 
behavior of legal actors. I have shown how the structure of systems built 
on set-theoretic logic gives rise to subtle formal distinctions in the set-
theoretic relations among which legal actors must choose in the work of 
advocacy and adjudication. And I have demonstrated how recognition 
of this deep formal structure of legal systems both clarifies the terms of 
debate in various areas of legal theory and implies some emergent 
structural properties of legal systems that substantive legal theory must 
grapple with. 
